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A physicist sits as a juror in a murder case. The victim is a six-year-old 
boy. The cause of death: a screwdriver driven into the boy's chest. The boy's 
father, who is charged with murder, claims the boy accidentally tripped and fell 
onto the screwdriver in the bathroom. In support of this theory, the defense 
calls an expert witness, a physicist who testifies that-given the physical 
characteristics of the entry wound and the way objects are propelled through 
space-it is unlikely the boy was intentionally stabbed. The physicist juror 
disagrees, and during jury deliberations he suggests that the calculations the 
expert witness presented do not support the defense's conclusions. The jury 
convicts.' 
A nurse serves as a juror in a domestic violence case. The alleged victim 
has recanted her original charges that the defendant kidnapped as well as 
sexually and physically assaulted her. She testifies that bumps on her head 
were caused by acne, rather than by hair pulling during an assault. The defense 
calls a physician as an expert witness who testifies that the small bumps could 
indeed have been caused by acne. During deliberations the nurse juror 
disagrees, telling her fellow jurors that the small bumps on the woman's head 
are similar to those she has observed on other victims of domestic violence. 
The jury  convict^.^ 
These are not hypotheticals. They are drawn from real cases involving 
actual jury deliberations. Similar examples abound. A psychologist juror 
informs her fellow jurors that she is skeptical of the accuracy of polygraph 
tests.3 A third-generation boxer informs the court during voir dire that, if his 
fellow jurors ask about the damage likely to be caused by a "hook or a jab," he 
will tell them.4 An occupational therapist states that a mother's illness during 
1 .  This fact pattern is drawn from State v. Mann, 39 P.3d 124, 125 (N.M. 2002). 
2. This description is drawn from Meyer v. State, 80 P.3d 447 (Nev. 2003). 
3. See In re Malone, 91 1 P.2d 468 (Cal. 1996). 
4. See People v. Cheny, 729 N.Y.S.2d 591,596 (Sup. Ct. 2001). 
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pregnancy, not the negligence of a doctor, caused a child's birth d e f e ~ t . ~  A 
junior grade civil engineer sits on a jury in a railroad crossing fatality case that 
turns on the engineering of safety devices for railroad crossings.6 
Should any of these jurors have served? If so, should they have been 
instructed to withhold their professional knowledge and judgment during 
deliberations? Perhaps most importantly, should the verdict have been 
overturned if one of them used her expertise to sway her fellow jurors? 
Such questions have arisen with increasing frequency because, over the 
past two decades, the historic exemptions that automatically excused those with 
professional training fiom jury duty have been eliminated. The result has been 
a transformation of the American jury system. In New York state alone, 
occupational exemptions that shielded one million people7 from jury service 
have been repealed.8 With so many professionally trained "expert  juror^"^ now 
available to serve, it is important to confront the issues that arise when they 
serve in cases involving their professional expertise. 
A central assumption of jury deliberations in the adversarial system is that 
jurors make decisions based on the evidence presented at trial. In the words of 
one scholar, "[tlhe traditional view of the juror's role throughout trial is that of 
an empty vessel into which information presented in the form of exhibits, 
testimony, argument, and judicial instructions will be poured."10 For this 
reason, jurors are typically instructed that they cannot draw on extraneous 
information in their deliberations." The rationale for prohibiting extraneous 
5. See Richards v. Overlake Hosp. Med. Ctr., 796 P.2d 737,742 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990). 
6. See Michael B. Mushlin, Survey of Jury Consultants (2006) (unpublished manuscript on file 
with author) [hereinafter JURY CONSULTANT SURVEY] (Respondent #26, Question 1). 
7. See CONTINUING JURY REFORM IN NEW YORK STATE 7 (2001), available at 
h t t p : / / n y s l . n y s e d . g o v l u h t b i n / c g i s i r s i r r u 5  18/0/50404367/Content/l 
?new_gateway-db=HYPERION&user-id=CATALOG [hereinafter 2001 N.Y. REPORT]. 
8. Act To Amend the Judiciary Law, in Relation to Jury Service, ch. 86, $8 1-12, 1995 N.Y. Laws 
682-84. 
9. This term "expert juror" was used by Professor Paul F. Kirgis to describe any person who, had 
he testified at trial, would have been considered an expert witness. See Paul F. Kirgis, The Problem of 
the Expert Juror, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 493, 496, 527-28 (2002). 1 believe Kirgis's definition is too narrow 
to cover the full range of  jurors whose presence might cause difficulties should their specialized 
knowledge be used during jury deliberations. For example, a nurse sitting on a jury considering the 
cause of death in a homicide case would not qualify as a medical expert witness but could nevertheless 
cause difficulties if chosen for jury service. Indeed, this is exactly what happened in one of the 
prominent cases discussed in this Article, People v. Maragh, 729 N.E.2d 701 (N.Y. 2000). Thus, I prefer 
the term "professional juror." This term includes not only individuals who would qualify as expert 
witnesses, but also those with professional training or experience in a field relevant to the issues at bar. 
Individuals with merely cursory knowledge of a given field or industry, such as an individual who has 
taken a few undergraduate classes or has read books on the topic, would not fall under this definition. 
10. NANCY S. MARDER, THE JURY PROCESS 105 (2005) ("Another way to understand this 
traditional conception is to think of the juror as a sponge. In other words, the juror will simply absorb all 
of the information presented at trial, just as a sponge absorbs water."); see also Bennett L. Gershman, 
Contaminating the Verdict: The Problem ofJuror Misconduct, 50 S.D. L. REV. 322,328-29 (2005). 
11. See 89 C.J.S. Trial $5 543-44 (2006); see also, e.g., 1A COMM. ON PATTERN JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS, ASS'N OF N.Y. SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, NEW YORK PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS- 
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information is that the adversarial process would be compromised if jurors 
were allowed independently to investigate or to collect facts.I2 The system 
would be jeopardized not only because the information was obtained without 
~ - 
the court's or counsel's knowledge, but also because it was not subject to the 
tests and filters provided by the rules of evidence or the crucible of cross- 
examination. Moreover, counsel could not refer to it--or respond to it-in 
opening or closing arguments. 
On the other hand, jurors are not expected to function as blank slates, 
purging their minds of any prior experience that might be relevant to the matter 
at hand.13 As Professor Bennett Gershrnan has observed: 
It is not expected that jurors should leave their common sense . . . at the door before 
entering the jury room. Nor is it expected that jurors should not apply their own 
knowledge, experience, and perceptions acquired in the everyday affairs of life to 
14 
reach a verdict. 
Therefore, it is also standard to instruct the panel that each person is permitted 
to draw on his or her everyday experience in reaching a verdict.15 
The tension between these two policies emerges starkly in considering the 
role of professional jurors.16 Juries are expected to decide cases based on 
CIVIL 5 1:25 (2006) [hereinafter N.Y. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS--CIVIL] ("In deciding this case, 
you may consider only the exhibits which have been admitted in evidence and the testimony of the 
witnesses as you have heard it in this courtroom.. . ."). Moreover, jurors are told they may not make 
unauthorized visits or conduct experiments. Id. 5 1:25A cmt. Bailiffs and others also are prohibited from 
talking to jurors about the case, and jurors are forbidden from talking to third parties about the case. See, 
e.g., United States v. Posner, 644 F. Supp. 885, 889-90 (S.D. Fla. 1986); People v. Holmes, 372 N.E.2d 
656, 658-59 (Ill. 1978); People v. Crimmins, 258 N.E.2d 708, 709-10 (N.Y. 1970); Gershman, supra 
note 10, at 324-31 (describing cases in which verdicts were overturned because jurors spoke to court 
personnel including bailiffs and deputy sheriffs, as well as cases in which jurors improperly spoke to 
third parties); see also Sherman v. Smith, 89 F.3d 1134, 1137-38 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding improper but 
harmless a juror's unauthorized visit to the crime scene during the course of the trial); infra notes 89-93 
(citing cases of improper juror experimentation). 
12. See 66 C.J.S. New Trial 5 71 (2007) ("It is generally ground for a new trial that the jury 
examined witnesses or received other testimony in the jury room during their deliberations . . . ."); see 
also Christopher H. Hall, Annotation, Unauthorized View of Premises by Juror or Jury in Criminal 
Case as Ground for Reversal, New Trial, or Mistrial, 50 A.L.R. ~ T H  995 (1 986). 
13. See United States v. Kelly, 722 F.2d 873, 880 (1st Cir. 1983) ("To assert that each juror's mind 
must be a tabula rasa is an absurdity and the courts have consistently recognized this . . . ."); see also 
Bibbins v. Dalsheim, 21 F.3d 13, 17 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that a juror's "observation concerning the 
life of this community is part of the fund of ordinary experience that jurors may bring to the jury room 
and may rely upon"); People v. Szymanski, 589 N.E.2d 148, 152 (111. App. Ct. 1992) ("[Tlhe law is well 
established that the jury has a right to consider the evidence in light of its own knowledge and 
observations in the affairs of life."); People v. Brown, 399 N.E.2d 51, 53 (N.Y. 1979) ("It is not 
expected that their selection as jurors should cripple their cognitive functions."). 
14. Gershman, supra note 10, at 331 (citing cases). 
15. See, e.g., N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYS., Juror Expertise, in CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
2~ (1996) [hereinafter Juror Expertise], available at http://www.nycourts.gov/cji/ (select "General 
Charges," then "Juror Expertise") ("ln evaluating the evidence and the issues presented, you should use 
your common sense, knowledge, and experience just as you would in making decisions in your daily 
life") ; see also 1A N.Y. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS--CIVIL, supra note 11, 5 1:25A. 
16. An additional complication is the fact that "deliberations are conducted in strict secrecy," an 
effective zone of privacy meant to protect the deliberative process. MARDER, supra note 10, at 147; see 
also 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law 5 1855 (2006); 38A C.J.S. Grand Juries 5 179 (2006); Mark Kadish, 
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evidence that is presented in open court and subject to challenge by the 
opposing side. That policy is put at risk if a juror with relevant professional 
expertise is allowed to share specialized knowledge with fellow jurors. At the 
same time, jurors are expected to function in a common-sense manner, drawing 
on the knowledge gained from living their lives. With professional jurors, it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to fully accommodate one policy without violating 
the other. As a result, courts must confront the question of whether a 
professional juror's use of his own expertise is "outside knowledge" or just 
reliance on his everyday experience. Even if a professional juror can use his 
expertise to reach his own conclusion about the case, courts must also decide 
whether he can share that opinion-and the basis for that opinion-with his 
fellow jurors without violating the policy that cases be decided on the evidence 
presented at trial. 
Put another way, the use of professional jurors poses two distinct legal 
issues in the context of cases involving their areas of expertise. First, should 
such jurors be allowed to be challenged for cause based solely on their 
expertise? Second, if they do serve, should they be allowed to use and share 
their expertise? 
This Article addresses both questions and answers them in the affirmative. 
It advocates two changes to the law. First, parties should be allowed (but not 
required) to strike professional jurors for cause in cases involving their 
expertise without any additional showing of a particular bias toward one side or 
the other. Second, if such jurors are empanelled, they should not be "gagged." 
Rather, they should be free to draw on and share their expertise as are all other 
jurors. 
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I discusses recent reform efforts 
that have fundamentally altered the jury system by opening it up to increased 
numbers of professional jurors. Part I1 examines the law on this subject and the 
central debates" over how jurors in general-professional or not-should and 
Behind the Locked Door of an American Grand JUT: Its History. Its Secrecy, and Its Process, 24 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 1, 16 (1996). Because this secrecy is seen as crucial to the functioning of juries, the 
Federal Rules of Evidence bar individual jurors from filing affidavits describing the jury's deliberative 
process, thereby "impeaching" a verdict. See FED. R. EVID. 606(b) (prohibiting a juror from impeaching 
her own verdict unless the evidence of jury deliberations depicts "extraneous prejudicial information" or 
"outside influence" brought to bear on the jury's deliberations). 
17. There is surprisingly little in the legal literature that deals directly with the subject of 
professional jurors. To date, only two scholarly treatments of the subject of professional jurors have 
appeared in law reviews. See Kirgis, supra note 9; Sharon Blanchard Hawk, Note, State v. Mann: 
Extraneous Prejudicial Information in the Jury Room: Beautiful Minds Allowed, 34 N.M. L. REV. 149 
(2004). The issue has been addressed more frequently in legal periodicals, perhaps indicating that this is 
an issue of more concern to active litigators than to academics. See, e.g., Steven W .  Fisher, The 
Continuing Problem of Juror Expertise, N.Y.L.J., May 5 ,  2003, at 4; Thomas A. Moore & Matthew 
Gaier, Expertise Among Prospective Jurors, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 12,2001, at 3; Leonard Post, Dealing with 
Jurors' Expertise, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 12, 2005, at 21; Janine Sagar, Nurse Jurors Talked Too Much: 
Shared Expertise Prejudices Material Issue, FORENSIC ECHO, Oct. 25, 2000, 
hnp://echo.forensicpanel.com/2001/10/24/nursejurors.htm1. See generally W.E. Shipley, Admissibility 
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do use prior knowledge when they deliberate. Part I1 also explores how courts 
grapple with the issue of prior knowledge in the case of professional jurors. 
There is broad agreement among the courts that it is impermissible to challenge 
jurors based solely on their expertise. The courts are split, however, on how to 
handle professional jurors once they are seated. Some courts-most notably the 
influential New York Court of Appeals-require lower courts to instruct 
professional jurors that it would be "wrong" for them to convey their 
knowledge to fellow jurors even if it is material to the determination of the 
case, and that they must refrain from using their professional expertise to 
influence their colleagues during deliberations.18 In other words, New York 
courts attempt to impose a gag. Other jurisdictions, however, allow 
professional jurors free reign to use their expertise during the deliberation 
process. 19 
Absent from the discussion are the views of professional experts in the field 
of jury selection. Part 111 attempts to fill that void, introducing the results of an 
original survey of leading jury consultants fiom across the nation. The survey 
asked consultants to report their observations on the frequency with which 
professionals serve on juries in cases involving their expertise; the influence of 
professional jurors; and whether such jurors can realistically be excluded from 
jury panels in such cases. Finally, the consultants were asked about their views 
on the law-whether professional jurors ought to be able to serve, and if so, 
what special instructions, if any, they ought to be given. The survey responses 
provide important observations from those on the front lines of the jury 
selection process. In particular, the results suggest three things: First, 
professionals do often sit on jury panels in cases in which their expertise is 
and Effect, in Criminal Case, of Evidence as to Juror's Statements, During Deliberations, as to Facts 
Not Introduced into Evidence, Annotation, 58 A.L.R.2d 556 (2005). 
18. See 1A N.Y. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS--CIVIL, supra note 11, 5 1:25A ("Although as 
jurors you are encouraged to use all your life experiences in analyzing testimony and reaching a fair 
verdict, you may not communicate any personal professional expertise you might have or other facts not 
in evidence to the other jurors during deliberations. You must base your discussions and decisions solely 
on the evidence presented to you during the trial and that evidence alone. You may not consider or 
speculate on matters not in evidence or matters outside the case."); Juror Expertise, supra note 15 
("Some of you, however, may have something more than ordinary knowledge or experience in a certain 
area. Indeed, it may be that you have developed a special expertise in a certain area, well beyond what 
an average person would have. If you have such a special expertise, and it relates to some material issue 
in this case, it would be wrong for you to rely on that special expertise to inject into your deliberations 
either a fact that is not in evidence or inferable from the evidence, or an opinion that could not be drawn 
fiom the evidence by a person without that special expertise. The reason it would be wrong to do so is 
that you must decide this case only on the evidence presented to you in this courtroom. Therefore, with 
respect to any material issue in this case, you must not use any special expertise you have to insert into 
the deliberations evidence that has not been presented in this courtroom during the trial."). 
19. Still others refuse to make a clear decision, telling jurors elliptically that they must rely only on 
the evidence adduced at trial and that they cannot share any outside information with their colleagues, if 
that information derives from their own experience and if that experience is not shared by other people 
in the community. See, e.g., In re Malone, 91 1 P.2d 468, 468 (Cal. 1996); State v. Thacker, 596 P.2d 
508,509 (Nev. 1979). 
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involved. Second, under current law, there is little possibility of systematically 
excluding professionals from jury service in cases involving their expertise. 
Third, these jurors often play a pivotal role in jury deliberations. 
Finally, in Part IV, I articulate two proposals. I argue that the law should be 
changed to allow challenges for cause whenever a professional juror is 
considered for service in a case involving the juror's professional knowledge. 
The challenge for cause should be allowed whether or not there is evidence that 
the juror may be biased toward one side or the other. I argue that this proposal 
is supported by the available evidence, which strongly suggests that there is an 
elevated risk that the professional juror will unduly affect the verdict.20 This 
recommendation, if followed, would drastically reduce, although not totally 
eliminate, the number of professionals who serve on juries in cases that are 
inappropriate for them to hear or decide. Second, I argue that courts should go 
no further-they should refrain from attempting to "gag" professional jurors 
with ominous limiting instructions. Gagging professional jurors is bound to be 
ineffective, and it is inconsistent with the goal of preserving the proper role of 
juries. This proposal accords with the views of jury consultants, who 
overwhelmingly report that, even if a gagging instruction is followed, it is 
unlikely to achieve its purpose of neutralizing the professional juror's influence 
on the jury.2' 
At first blush, these proposals might seem inconsistent. If professional 
jurors can be challenged for cause in cases involving issues in which they have 
expertise, why not prevent those who are empanelled from speaking to their 
expertise? However, as I argue in Part IV, there is a significant difference 
between expanding challenges for cause and gagging professional jurors. While 
the former helps purge trials of the potentially detrimental presence of 
professionals on juries (while doing little harm), gagging professional jurors 
after jury selection encroaches on the sensitive deliberation process. Thus, the 
two proposals are consistent, and when implemented together, they will 
significantly improve the manner in which the legal system handles 
professional jurors. Professional jurors will no longer be "bound and 
gagged"-bound to serve on juries in cases that implicate their expertise, but 
prevented from serving fully and openly when they take their seats as jurors. 
20. The survey yielded a good deal of  useful and new information; it also demonstrated the value of  
further empirical research concerning the effect of professionals on jury deliberations. 
2 1 .  See infra Section 1V.B. 
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A. Occupational Exemptions from Jury Service 
Professionals have not always served on juries.22 Due to so-called 
occupational exclusion statutes in many jurisdictions, most professionals were, 
until quite recently, exempt from jury Occupational exemptions were 
justified on various grounds. Professionals argued that the duties they 
performed were too valuable to be halted for jury or that they "would 
not be appropriate jurors in particular cases" because of their professional 
expertise.25 Clergy argued that jury service would violate their professional 
ethics, forcing them to make the type of judgments about other human beings 
that were incompatible with their religious re~~onsib i l i t ies .~~ 
These arguments held considerable sway. New York, for example, 
maintained occupational exemptions for many years.27 First enacted for a 
limited number of fields,28 the list of exemptions grew over time, reflecting the 
growing political clout of more and more professional organizations.29 By the 
22. See, e . g ,  Joanna Sobol, Xardship Excuses and Occupational Exemptions: The Impairment of' 
the "Fair Cross-Section of the Community, " 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 155, 165 n.37 (1995) (noting that at one 
point California had as many as seventeen statutory exemptions from jury duty). 
23. See id. at 165 ("Exemptions traditionally have been granted to every occupational group with 
sufficient legislative influence to obtain passage of an exemption statute." (citing V. HALE STARR & 
MARK MCCORMICK, JURY SELECTION 44 (2d ed. 1993 & Supp. 1994))). Of course, minorities and 
women also have been historically excluded from jury service, but for very different and more sinister 
reasons. 
24. See Mark A. Behrens & Andrew W. Crouse, The Evolving Civil Justice Reform Movement: 
Procedural Reforms Have Gained Steam, but Critics Still Focus on Arguments of the Past, 31 U. 
DAYTON L. REV. 173 (2006); Hillel Y. Levin &John W. Emerson, Is There a Bias Against Education in 
the Jury Selection Process?, 38 CONN. L. REV. 325, 329 n.14 (2006); Sobol, supra note 22, at 175. 
25. THE JURY PROJECT, supra note 23, at 32. 
26. Id. (discussing whether clergy have valid ethical reasons for a blanket exemption from jury 
service, and finding that they do not, because a belief held by a small number of religious sects does not 
justify exemptions for all clergy of every religion). The Jury Project also discussed whether allowing 
judges to be called for jury service was ethically proper and concluded that it was not. See id. at 29-30. 
The Project therefore did not recommend repealing section 5 11 of the New York Judiciary Law, which 
granted judges an exemption from jury service. However, the New York Legislature disagreed and 
abolished occupational exemptions for judges. An Act To Amend the Judiciary Law, in Relation to Jury 
Service, ch. 86, 5 4, 1995 N.Y. Laws 683 (codified at N.Y. JUD. LAW 5 500 (McKinney 2003)). As a 
result of this repeal, judges, including Chief Judge Judith Kaye, have been called to jury duty. Jamy 
Scon, Line of Work. Ma hm? Chief Judge: No Automatic Juror Exemptions, Not Even for Judith S. 
Kaye, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1996, at B3. 
27. THE JURY PROECT, supra note 23, at 31 (citing N.Y. JUD. LAW 5 512). 
28. Id. at 32. 
29. Originally, New York State exempted several groups from jury duty: members of the clergy, 
Christian Science practitioners, licensed physicians, dentists, optometrists, psychologists, podiatrists, 
registered nurses, practical nurses, embalmers, Christian Science nurses, attorneys, police officers, 
correction officers, members of a fire company, volunteer firemen, sole proprietors, principal managers 
of a business employing less than three persons, persons seventy years of age or older, parents or 
guardians who provide daily care for a child under the age of sixteen, prosthetists, orthotists, and 
licensed physical therapists. N.Y. JUD. LAW 512 (McKinney 1995) (repealed 1996). 
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mid-1990s, a dazzling array of professionals was formally excused from 
reporting for jury duty, including physicians, dentists, pharmacists, 
optometrists, psychologists, podiatrists, registered nurses, practical nurses, 
Christian Science nurses, embalmers, attorneys, police officers, corrections 
officers, members of fire departments, orthodontists, licensed physical 
therapists, and all members of the clergy.30 The exemptions were so extensive 
that in New York City and its surrounding suburbs 5-10% of all persons who 
were otherwise eligible for jury duty were excluded by statutory occupational 
exemptions.31 
B. The Fall of Occupational Exemptions 
Despite their occupational exemptions did not enjoy much 
academic support. As early as 1930, there were calls in leading legal journals 
for an end to them.33 Nevertheless, occupational exemptions persisted until the 
1970s, when broader reform efforts led to changes calculated to produce truly 
representative juries. These efforts were influenced in part by the wave of civil 
rights and women's movement litigation challenging exclusionary jury 
policies. In 1975, the Supreme Court announced its landmark decision in 
Taylor v. ~ o u i s i a n a , ~ ~  which held that a local law that categorically excluded 
women was unconstitutional because the resulting jury pool did not represent a 
LLfair cross section" of the community.35 The Taylor court reasoned that the fair 
cross section requirement is "fundamental to the jury trial guaranteed by the 
Sixth ~ rnendrnen t . "~~  The Court observed that "[c]ornmunity participation . . . 
is not only consistent with our democratic heritage but is also critical to public 
30. Id. at 3 1. 
3 1. Id. at 33. The Jury Project also noted that in New Jersey, which had exemptions similar to New 
York's at the time, a 1982 study indicated that the percentage of jurors excluded based on that state's 
exemptions was in the range of 15% statewide. Id. (citing INTERIM REPORT OF THE JURY SYSTEM 
MANAGEMENT ADVISORY COMMITTEE 35 (1984)); see also Vikram David Amar, More on What's 
Wrong with the Modern Jury? How Jury Selection Can Be Improved, FINDLAW.COM, Feb. 20, 2004, 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/amar/2004022O.html (arguing that exemptions "should be extremely 
limited" and citing a study indicating that "fully half of Californians failed to appear" for jury duty). 
32. See AM. BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS RELATING TO JUROR USE AND MANAGEMENT STD. NO. 6, at 
49-56 (1993) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS]; PAULA DIPERNA, JURIES ON TRIAL 87 (1984); JOHN M. 
VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES 63, 11 1-34 (1977); Sobol, supra note 22, at 164-73; Maura 
Dolan, Why Jurors Err: They're Just Human, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1994, at A23. 
33. E.g., Note, Proposed Legislation for Jury Reform in New York, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 721 (1930). 
34. 419 U.S. 522 (1975). 
35. Id. at 533. 
36. Id. at 530; see also Smith v. Texas, 31 1 U.S. 128, 130 (1940) ("Juries as instruments of public 
justice . . . [should] be [bodies] truly representative of the community."); Robert C. Walters, Michael D. 
Marin & Mark Cuniden, Jury of Our Peers: An Unfulfilled Constitutional Promise, 58 SMU L. REV. 
319, 335-39 (2005) (tracing the "fair cross section" requirement from Smith to present). The effect on 
modem jury law is obvious. Cf: N.Y. JUD. LAW 5 500 (McKinney 2003) ("It is the policy of this state 
that all litigants in the courts of this state entitled to trial by jury shall have the right to grand and petit 
juries selected at random from a fair cross section of the community . . . ."). 
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confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system."37 Additional 
decisions from the Supreme Court and lower courts have struck down other 
discriminatory barriers to jury service as well, including restrictions based on 
race or ethnic Indeed, as long ago as 1946 the Supreme Court 
proclaimed that: 
The American tradition of trial by jury, considered in connection with either 
criminal or civil proceedings, necessarily contemplates an impartial jury drawn 
from a cross-section of the community. This does not mean, of course, that every 
jury must contain representatives of all the economic, social, religious, racial, 
political and geographical groups of the community; frequently such complete 
representation would be impossible. But it does mean that prospective jurors shall 
be selected by court officials without systematic and intentional exclusion of any of 
these groups. Recognition must be given to the fact that those eligible for jury 
service are to be found in every stratum of society. Jury competence is an individual 
rather than a group or class matter. That fact lies at the very heart of the jury 
system. To disregard it is to open the door to class distinctions and discriminations 
which are abhorrent to the democratic ideals of trial by jury. 39 
While the Court never specifically addressed the issue of occupational 
e ~ c e ~ t i o n s , 4 ~  the thrust of these holdings-that jury pools were to be composed 
of a realistic cross-section of society-strongly suggested how legally troubling 
they were.41 The movement to reform jury service was led by bar associations 
as well as commissions appointed by courts or legislatures to examine practices 
and make recommendations for change.42 The American Bar Association 
played a particularly important role and generated reform efforts in many 
states.43 This work led to recommendations for changes to virtually every 
37. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530. 
38. See, e.g., Castandeda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977) (noting that a systematic attempt to 
exclude Mexican-Americans from serving on a jury would be unconstitutional); cf: United States v. 
Black Bear, 878 F.2d 213,214-15 (8th Cir. 1989) (noting that Native Americans were a "distinct group" 
within the community and that their systematic under-representation in a jury pool would be 
unconstitutional, but finding insufficient evidence of such exclusion in this case to overturn jury 
verdict). 
39. Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217,220 (1946) (citations omitted). 
40. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 47-48 (1992); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991); 
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86-87 (1986); Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979). While these 
holdings influenced the elimination of occupational exemptions, they did not compel them. In fact, the 
Court has never taken a case which presents the issue. Instead, the fall of occupational exemptions has 
been entirely driven by nonlitigation reform efforts. See infra notes 48-65 and accompanying text. 
41. See Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, Improving the Jury System in Virginia: Jury 
Patriotism Legislation Is Needed, l l GEO. MASON L. REV. 657,659 (2003); Patrick McLarney & Cary 
Silverman, Fulfilling the Promise of a Representative Jury, 59 J .  MO. B. 172, 172-74 (2003); Sobol, 
supra note 22, at 196 n.40; see also Amar, supra note 31 (arguing that traditional occupational 
exemptions result in the elimination of educated individuals from juries). Amar opines that "[wlhen 
juries produce stupid results, it is often because [the courts] let interested parties-through their 
lawyers-pick jurors in stupid ways. [The] point is not that less educated jurors should not be on juries; 
it is that more educated jurors should not so frequently be excluded from them." Id. 
42. For a comprehensive list of secondary materials on jury reform, see Nat'l Ctr. for State Courts, 
The Jury Bookshelf, http:Nwww.ncsconline.org/wCPublications~es~Juries~Ju~Bookshel~b.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 13, 2007). 
43. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 32. These standards "are the result of five years of 
painstaking work by twenty nationally representative panels of judges, lawyers, and jury experts aided 
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aspect of jury service, including the manner in which jurors are called, the 
manner in which they are empanelled, and the manner in which they conduct 
 deliberation^.^^ 
The New York experience helps to illustrate how the dismantling of 
occupational exemptions was a part of broader efforts at reforming the jury 
system. In 1993, New York Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye initiated the "Jury 
Project," a commission of thirty judges, attorneys, jury commissioners, 
educators, journalists and business people charged with examining and 
critiquing the state's jury system.45 Specifically, they were instructed to 
consider how New York might achieve three main objectives: "jury pools that 
are truly representative of the community; a jury system that operates 
efficiently and effectively; and jury service that is a positive experience for the 
citizens who are summoned to serve."46 
The Jury Project concluded that exemptions for professionals called into 
question the representative nature of the jury. Additionally, the Project found 
that occupational exemptions4' placed a disproportionate burden on those not 
by some of the country's leading scholars and research institutions." THE JURY PROJECT, supra note 23, 
at iii. The ABA's efforts sparked a number of states, including New York, to significantly reform their 
own jury practices. See G. Thomas Munsterman, A Brief History of State Jury Reform Eflorts, 79 
JUDICATURE 216, 218 (1995) (listing Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, 
Minnesota, Missouri, North Dakota, Ohio, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia as  states that have 
adopted the ABA standards). 
44. See, e.g.,  ABA PMNCIPLES FOR JURIES AND JURY TRIALS (2005) (setting out nineteen 
principles for assembling a jury, conducting a jury trial, jury deliberations, and post-verdict activity); 
THE JURY PROJECT, supra note 23 (recommending comprehensive changes in New York's jury system); 
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 32; see also People v. Harper, 818 N.Y.S.2d 113 (Sup. Ct. 2006); People 
v. Miller, 646 N.Y.S.2d 965 (Rochester City Ct. 1996). For further information on state jury reform 
efforts, see, for example, Munsterman, supra note 43; Victor Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Jury Service 
is Changing in Ohio, 32 CAP. U. L. REV. 101 (2003); and Rebecca L. Kourlis & John Leopold, COLO. 
LAW, Feb. 2000, at 21. 
45. Colleen McMahon & David L. Kornblau, Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye's Program of Jury 
Selection Reform in New York, I0 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT 263,263-64 (1 995). 
46. THE JURY PROJECT, supra note 23, at i. The Jury Project was charged with "recommending rule 
changes, legislative proposals, and educational programs and materials." Id. This jury reform effort was 
one of the first initiatives of Chief Judge Kaye in her tenure as Chief Judge. Id. The Chief Judge's 
interest in jury reform "initially arose out of one of the recurring concerns that have bred so much 
dissatisfaction among jurors and potential jurors in New York." Id. at i-ii. Like many states, New York 
looked to the ABA standards for guidance, and indeed, "[tlhe ABA Standards were [the] organizing 
principles, and in many instances [it] needed only to endorse them and suggest specific ways in which 
they might be implemented." Id. at iii. 
47. At the time the Jury Project began, the New York Judiciary Law contained two provisions 
exempting various professionals from jury service: the exemption statute and the disqualification statute. 
Originally enacted in 1977, the exemption statute provided an exemption from jury service for members 
of the clergy, physicians, attorneys, police officers, and sole proprietors, among others. Act of June 29, 
1977, ch. 316, 8  2, 1977 N.Y. Laws 351 (codified at N.Y. JUD. LAW 5 s  500-512 (repealed 1995)). 
Through the years, the law was amended several times to include additional exemptions for 
professionals such as prosthetists and orthotists, Act of May 13, 1980, ch. 1 14 5  I, 1980 N.Y. Laws 242, 
corrections officers, An Act To Amend the Judiciary Law, ch. 350, 5  1, 1981 N.Y. Laws 61 1-12, and 
physical therapists, An Act To Amend the Judiciary Law, ch. 126, 5  1, 1982 N.Y. Laws 486. The 
disqualification statute exempted members of the armed forces, elected officials, civil department heads, 
and state and federal judges from jury service in New York. Act of June 29, 1977, ch. 316, 3 2, 1977 
N.Y. Laws 351. 
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exempted by allowing professionals to be "free riders7' and fostering public 
discontent with the jury system.48 The Project's report described a system in 
which "[w]orking people who must use vacation time to serve on juries are 
justifiably upset that medical personnel and lawyers can be spared by their 
patients and clients for a month or more vacation every year, yet don't have to 
sit on juries."49 Calling occupational exemptions "the jury system's single 
greatest inequity,"50 the Commission urged the legislature to eliminate them,5' 
and the legislature responded with alacrity, abolishing occupational exemptions 
the following year.52 
The change added one million people to the New York State jury 
48. THE JURY PROJECT, supra note 23, at 33. 
49. Id. 
50. 2001 N.Y. REPORT, supra note 7, at 7. 
5 1. The Jury Project, relying on the ABA standards, had recommended that all disqualifications be 
eliminated, except for the disqualification of judges in courts of record. THE JURY PROJECT: supra note 
23, at 29. 
52. N.Y. JUD. LAW 5 500 (McKinney 2003). The legislature generally followed the Project's 
recommendations, although it did not disqualify judges, and as a result, Chief Judge Kaye herself was 
summonsed for jury duty. Briefly, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 2, 1996, at A5. ("N.Y. Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye, 
called to jury duty under her own reform denying exemptions, never got to serve on a jury. Questioned 
for only one paqel and c ~ t ,  Judge .%ye says, '! !eft extremely disappointed."'). The repeal of all other 
occupational exemptions was supported by the New York State Assembly, the State Senate, the State 
Unified Court System, the New York League of Women Voters, and the Association of the Bar of the 
City of New York, among other leading organizations. See, e.g., N.Y. BAR ASS'N, LEGISLATION 
REPORT NO. 201 (June 9, 1995); Letter from Assemblywoman Helen E. Weinstein to Governor George 
E. Pataki (June 23, 1995), in N.Y. Counsel to the Governor, 12590-97 Legislative Bill & Veto Jackets, 
ch. 86, at 5 (1995) (on file with the State Archives and Records Administration, State University of  New 
York-Albany) [hereinafter Veto Jackets]; Letter from Michael Colander, Counsel, N.Y. Unified Coun 
Sys., to Michael C. Finnegan, Counsel to the Governor (June 26, 1995), in Veto Jackets, supra, at 7; 
Letter from Alan Rothstein, Counsel to the Executive Sec'y, Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., to 
Michael C. Finnegan, Counsel to the Govemor (June 30, 1995), in Veto Jackets, supra, at 52; Letter 
from Leonore H. Banks, Vice President, League of Women Voters of N.Y., to Govemor George E. 
Pataki (June 20, 1995), in Veto Jackets, supra, at 29. However, the bill to repeal professional 
exemptions also had its opponents, including police and firefighter organizations, private professionals, 
and municipalities. See, e.g., Letter from Edward C. Farrell, Executive Dir., N.Y. Conference of Mayors 
and Mun. Officials, to Michael C. Finnegan, Counsel to the Governor (June 22, 1995), in Veto Jackets, 
supra, at 15; Letter from Paul D. Carozza, President, Metro. Police Conference of N.Y., to Michael C .  
Finnegan, Counsel to the Governor (June 27, 1995), in Veto Jackets, supra, at 13; Letter from William 
N. Young, Jr., Counsel, Ass'n of Fire Districts of N.Y., to Governor George L. Pataki (June 28, 1995), 
in Veto Jackets, supra, at 18. 
53. Robert C. Walters et al., Juty of Our Peers: An  Unfulfilled Constitutional Promise, 58 SMU L. 
REV. 319, 351-52 (2005). Although the recent trend has been to eliminate occupational exemptions, 
there are reasonable arguments in favor of them. For instance, it has been argued that members of 
certain professions, such as lawyers, are not likely to be chosen for juries, and should therefore be 
exempted. Likewise, it has been argued that individuals who would suffer personally as a result of  jury 
duty-such as those who are self-employed-should be exempted. See Am. Judicature Soc'y, Choosing 
Who Serves: Who 1s Eligible?, http://www.ajs.org/jc/juries/jc~whoserveseligible.asp (last visited Mar. 
I, 2006). 
While general opinion of the elimination of professional exemptions has been positive, it has 
resulted in tangible hardships for some of the occupations previously exempted, particularly those 
individuals who are self-employed or operate small businesses. Some have noted that physicians have 
particular difficulty, given their typically inflexible and busy schedules. However, in a study conducted 
by the Vera Institute of Justice, only 12% of physicians believed that they should be entitled to an 
occupational exemption from jury duty. By the same token, only 3% of Manhattan and 10% of Brooklyn 
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and has had a powerful impact on its juries. A 2001 report on the progress of 
jury reform efforts in New York revealed that, "[iln 1995, fewer than a third of 
those completing the jury exit survey report being first-time jurors. By 1999, 
[after the occupational exemptions were eliminated] over half were first time 
jurors. In some counties, like Westchester, Monroe and Onondaga, roughly 80 
percent were first-timers."s4 Even the state's most well-known citizens are now 
required to serve. Former New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, actress 
Marisa Tomei, former CBS newsman Ed Bradley, and Dr. Ruth Westheimer 
have all been called for jury service.55 A less sensational-but far more 
important-indication of major change is that within five years of the repeal of 
New York's occupational exemptions (and despite numerous predictions to the 
contrary) more than 7,000 attomeys had not only been called but were actually 
selected to serve on jury panels.s6 
New York's experience is hardly unique. During the past thirty years, a 
concerted national effort to eliminate occupational exemptions has been 
underway.57 Currently, twenty-five states and the District of Columbia have 
abolished all occupational exemptions.58 An additional seven states have 
attorneys believed that they should be entitled to an occupational exemption. See JULIA VITULLO- 
MARTIN, BRIAN MAXEY & CHRIS CESARNI, FIVE YEARS OF JURY REFORM: WHAT JURORS ARE SAYING 
12-1 3 (2000), available at http:Nwww.vera.orglpublication~pdf/ju~yfidpX 
54. 2001 N.Y. REPORT, supra note 7, at 8. Other New York counties, including Albany, Erie, 
Nassau, and Suffolk Counties, reported, in the wake of the repeal of juror exemptions, that over 60% of 
jurors were serving for the first time. Id. The ZOOI Report also reveals that members of the legal 
profession who are no longer exempt from service find jury service particularly valuable, as it offers a 
view of the legal system from a juror's seat and provides new perspective. 
55. Matthew Goldstein, Newsletter for Prospective Jurors Issued, N.Y. L.J, Nov. 25, 1997, at I. 
This is happening in other places as well. A more recent report in the National Law Journal describes a 
juror pool in Washington, D.C. that included former Secretary of State Madeline Albright and White 
House Adviser Karl Rove, both called for jury duty on the same day in the same courtroom. So Near, 
and Yet .  . . ., NAT'L L.J., July 31,2006, at 16. 
56. 2001 N.Y. REPORT, supra note 7, at 34-35 (finding that "lawyers were being selected to serve 
on juries in almost the same proportions as nonlawyers"). 
57. In 1970, the Uniform Jury Selection and Service Act (U.J.S.S.A) was promulgated. UNIF. JURY 
SELECTION & SERV. ACT $ 8  1-2, 13 U.L.A. 437 (1970); see also Sobol, supra note 22, at 199-203. In 
order to ensure that juries would consist of a fair cross section of the community, "[tlhe U.J.S.S.A. 
allows no automatic excuses and exemption[s]." Sobol, supra note 22, at 202. Several states, including 
Idaho, North Dakota, and Mississippi, adopted the U.J.S.S.A. and thereby eliminated exemptions from 
jury service based solely on occupation. See IDAHO CODE ANN. 2-21 1 (2004) ("No qualified 
prospective juror is exempt from jury service."); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 13-5-23, -25 (1999); N.D CENT. 
CODE 27-09.1-10 (1991) ("No qualified prospective juror is exempt from jury service."). 
In 1993, the ABA followed suit with a standard affirming that "all automatic excuses or exemptions 
from jury service should be eliminated." ABA STANDARDS, supra note 33, at 12. At least seventeen 
states have adopted or substantially complied with those standards. See Angie Brunhow, Dodging July 
Duty Gets Harder To Do: Jury Facts for Midland Region Nebraska and Iowa July Pools, OMAHA 
WORLD HERALD, Mar. 29, 1999, at A l ;  B. Michael Dann & George Logan 111, Jury Reform: The 
Arizona Experience, 79 JUDICATURE 280 (1995); Munsterman, supra note 43, at 218 nn.8-9. 
58. The following states had no exemptions from jury service as  of 2004: Arizona, Arkansas, 
California, Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Mississippi, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, 
Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. BUR. OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, STATE 
COURT ORGANIZATION 2004, at 223-26 (2006), available at http:Nwww.ojp.usdoj.govlbjs/pub/pdf/ 
Heinonline - -  25 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 251 2006-2007 
Yale Law 8: Policy Review Vol. 25:239,2007 
limited occupational exemptions to elected officials, judicial officers andlor 
members of the military on active duty.59 Five states currently extend 
occupational exemptions in a limited capacity to court and legislative 
personnel, law enforcement or firefighting personnel.60 Only twelve states 
provide exemptions to other types of civilian professionals, and even many of 
these are extremely limited in scope.6' In short, blanket occupational 
exemptions from jury service are no longer common. 
In retrospect, in the wake of Taylor v. Louisiana and its progeny, it became 
increasingly difficult to defend occupational exemptions. The old rationales- 
that professionals had more important things to do, that they were not suited for 
jury duty because of their expertise, or that they might be ethically precluded 
from serving-no longer held AS one commentator noted, occupational 
exemptions had to be eliminated if jury pools were to be composed of a 
realistic cross section of society.63 
To abolish occupational exemptions is one thing; to know what to do with 
professional jurors when they are called and appear to serve is quite another. 
The Jury Project, in its otherwise comprehensive report, failed to consider how 
sco04.pdf [hereinafter STATE COURT ORG.]. 
In the federal courts some occupational exemptions remain, but they are very limited. Current 
federal law exempts only: 
(A) members in active service in the Armed Forces of the United States; (B) members of the 
fire or police departments of any State, the District of Columbia, any tenitory or possession of 
the United States, or any subdivision of a State, the District of Columbia, or such temtory or 
possession; (C) public officers in the executive, legislative, or judicial branches of the 
Government of the United States, or of any State, the District of Columbia, any temtory or 
possession of the United States, or any subdivision of a State, the District of Columbia, or 
such territory or possession, who are actively engaged in the performance of official duties. 
28 U.S.C. 8 1863(b)(6) (2000). 
59. STATE COURT ORG., supra note 58, at 223-26 (Connecticut (judicial officers and elected 
officials), Florida (judicial office- elected officials, and cabinet officers), Georgia (elected officials and 
persons with permanent disabilities that prevent service), Maryland (military), Minnesota (judicial 
officers), New Hampshire (judicial officers and elected officials), and Pennsylvania (military and 
families of murder victims)). 
60. Id. (describing the exemptions of Nebraska (judicial officers and law enforcement), Nevada 
(elected officials and their staff), Rhode Island (elected officials, judicial officers, attorneys, law 
enforcement, and court staff), South Carolina (exempting "[alny person employed within the walls of 
any courthouse"), and Wyoming (elected officials, police, and firefighters)). In addition, federal courts 
exempt police and firefighters from jury duty under 28 U.S.C. 4 1863(b)(6)(B) (2000). 
61. STATE COURT ORG., supra note 58, at 223-26 (describing the exemptions of Alaska (teachers in 
failing schools), Hawaii (attorneys, dentists, doctors, and clergy), Indiana (dentists and veterinarians), 
Kansas (exempting "[plersons required elsewhere for public welfare, health or safety"), Maine 
(attorneys, doctors, and dentists), Missouri (doctors), Ohio (Amish), Oklahoma (attorneys), South 
Dakota (corrections personnel and clergy), Tennessee (attorneys, teachers, pharmacists, doctors, sole 
proprietors, nurses, CPAs, and clergy), Texas (students, caregivers of children under ten, and disabled 
persons), and Virginia (attorneys and sole proprietors)). 
62. As noted supra note 40, these opinions did not squarely deal with the constitutionality of 
occupational exemptions. That issue has not been the subject of litigation. 
63. Amar, supra note 3 1 (arguing that "it is perverse that professional and literate citizens are often 
exempted or struck from the jury pool"); see also Behrens & Silverman, supra note 41, at 659; 
McLamey & Silverman, supra note 41, at 172-74; Sobol, supra note 22, at 196. 
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courts should handle persons with professional experience called for jury 
service. In its zeal to abolish occupational exemptions, the Project brushed 
aside the argument that professional jurors should not sit in certain cases 
because of their specialized knowledge. The Jury Project had only this to say 
on the critical subject: 
[Olccupational exemptions (notably those for doctors and law enforcement officers) 
are often justified on the ground that these individuals would not be appropriate 
jurors in particular cases (physicians in malpractice and some tort cases; police 
officers in criminal cases). Putting aside the dubiousness of this proposition, there 
are obviously a large number of cases that do not implicate the special training or 
presumed biases of doctors and police officers, on which they could sit without any 
64 problem at all. 
But as New York's own experience in the wake of the Jury Project's report 
suggests, professionals are inundating jury panels in unprecedented numbers, 
and it is no longer appropriate to treat this issue in such a cursory fashion. 
Thus, we turn now to a deeper analysis of the problem, starting with an 
examination of applicable law on the proper role of professionals as jurors. 
The recent influx of professionals into jury pools presents scholars and 
practitioners with two related, though analytically distinct, questions: (1) 
should professional jurors be stricken for cause, and (2) if not, what 
instructions, if any, should they be given? This Part treats each issue in turn. 
As shall be discussed below, courts have generally not found expertise 
alone to be grounds for disqualifying a professional from jury service. As a 
result, professionals are found frequently on juries hearing cases involving their 
areas of expertise. Courts, however, have been far more divided on the question 
of how to deal with the risk that professionals will wield disproportionate 
influence in cases involving their areas of expertise, and some courts have 
attempted to prohibit professional jurors from speaking about their expertise 
during deliberations. 
A. Challenges 
Attorneys seeking to eliminate professionals from jury panels have only two 
tools at their disposal: the peremptory challenge and the challenge for cause.65 
Neither is an adequate filter for eliminating professional jurors. The peremptory 
challenge is limited numerically; the challenge for cause is limited substantively. 
64. THE JURY PROJECT, supra note 23, at 32. 
65. After receiving a jury summons, a prospective juror typically is placed in a "pool" of eligible 
jurors. That pool is then examined by the court and the parties through a voir dire, in order to determine 
which members of  the jury pool will be selected for a particular case. See generally MARDER, supra 
note 10, at 67-100. 
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1. Peremptory Challenges 
A peremptory challenge is one that generally requires no ju~tification.~~ 
The only exception is when such challenges are made on a constitutionally 
prohibited basis such as race or gender.67 Otherwise, peremptory challenges 
can be exercised at an attorney's whim. However, such challenges are limited 
numerically: both sides are typically provided between three and twenty 
peremptory challenges each, depending on the type of case and its 
complexity.68 
Peremptory challenges by no means offer a failsafe method for eliminating 
all professional jurors from a case. This is for two reasons. First, a lawyer may 
not want to use such a scarce resource to strike a professional juror, especially 
when another potential juror might be even more detrimental to the outcome of 
the case.69 Conversely, by the time the professional is called for questioning, an 
attorney may have already exhausted his available peremptory challenges.70 
Second, a juror's proficiency simply may not be evident at the point that 
peremptory challenges are e~ercised.~ '  
66. Id. at 84 ("Peremptory challenges are the challenges that lawyers exercise to remove 
prospective jurors From the panel without, at least traditionally, having to explain why."); see also 
RANDOLPH N. JONAKAIT, THE AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM 140 (2003) ("Whatever the system, the 
hallmark of peremptory challenges has been a grant of unfettered and unexplained discretion to the 
parties."). 
67. The leading authority for this proposition is Batson v. Kentucky, in which the Supreme Court 
held for the first time that it was unconstitutional to exercise a peremptoly challenge to strike a 
prospective juror solely because of the juror's race. 476 U.S. 79 (1986); see also 47 AM. JUR. 2~ Jury 5 
2 13 (2006) ("To establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination in the exercise of peremptory 
strikes, a defendant mush show that: (1) he is a member of a protected group; (2) the prosecutor has 
removed members of such a group; and (3) the totality of the circumstances gives rise to an inference 
that the prosecutor excluded jurors based on race.") If discriminatory intent is proven, the stricken juror 
or jurors are reinstated to the panel, or else jury selection begins anew. Batson, 476 U.S. at 89. The 
holding has been extended to include situations in which the juror strike is based solely on gender. See 
J.E.B. v. Alabama, 51 1 U.S. 127, 129 (1994); see also Wilsher v. State, 61 1 So. 2d 1175 (Ala. Crim. 
App. 1992); State v. Alen, 616 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 1993); Nancy J. Cutler, J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.: 
Excellent Ideology. Ineffective Implementation, 26 ST. IMARY's L.J. 503 (1995); James A. Domini & 
Eric Sheridan, Legal Comment, Batson Challenges and the Jury Project: Is New York Ready To 
Eliminate Discrimination from Criminal Jury Selection?, 11 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 169 
(1995). For a discussion of whether Batson should be extended to the use of peremptory strikes based on 
religion, see David M. Hinkle, Peremptory Challenges Based on Religious Affiliation: Are They 
Constitutional?, 9 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 139 (2005). 
68. See generally 47 AM. JUR. 2D Jury 5 207 (2006); 50A C.J.S. Juries $8 426,428 (2006). 
69. JURY SELECTION STRATEGY AND SCIENCE 5 23:2 (3d ed. 2005); JURY SELECTION: THE LAW, 
ART AND SCIENCE OF SELECTING A JURY 5 3:8 (2005); see also John T. Sullivan, Deterring the 
Discriminatory Use of Peremptory Challenges, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 477,481 (1984). 
70. See, e.g., Conrell v. State, 930 So. 2d 827, 828-29 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); People v. Arnold, 
96 N.Y.2d 358, 361 (N.Y. 2001); People v. Gamson, 818 N.Y.S.2d 141, 141 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006); 
People v. Grant, 747 N.Y.S.2d 189, 189 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002). 
71. See infra notes 225-226 and accompanying text. 
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2 .  Challenges for Cause 
In addition to peremptory challenges, an attorney may seek to exclude 
professional jurors by challenging the juror "for cause."72 Challenges for cause 
can be premised on one of two grounds. First, the prospective juror may be 
disqualified because she failed to meet an explicit statutory eligibility 
requirement for jury ser~ice. '~ If a prospective juror does not meet one or more 
of a state's eligibility requirements, a challenge for cause will be in order. For 
example, if a prospective juror is not old enough, not a resident of the state or 
county, or has a prior felony, he may not meet the statutory requirements for 
jury duty, and a challenge for cause will be in order.74 At one time, 
occupational exemptions worked in the same manner. But in states where 
occupational exemptions have been abolished, professionals are no longer 
statutorily ineligible for jury ser~ice , '~  and hence, this type of challenge for 
cause will not work. 
More pertinent to this discussion is the second type of challenge for 
cause-the challenge alleging bias or prejudice.76 Though the specific terms 
used may vary, all state and federal courts recognize this type of challenge.77 
Under current law in the state and federal courts, such challenges are 
considered appropriate when, despite the fact that the prospective juror meets 
72. See, e.g., JONAKAIT, supra note 66, at 128-38; MARDER, supra note 10, at 50 (noting that a 
challenge for cause can be used "to remove those prospective jurors who cannot be impartial or who do 
not satisfy the appearance of impartiality"); see also Ron Spears, You Don't Pick Who Serves on Your 
Jury--You Pick Who Doesn 't, 93 ILL. B.J. 420 (2005). 
73. See, e.g., ABA PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES AND JURY TRIALS princ. 1 l(B)(l) (2005); see also id. at 
princ. 2(A) (recommending that eligibility requirements should filter out individuals who are less than 
eighteen years of age, noncitizens, unable to communicate in the English language, or presently sewing 
a sentence for a felony conviction). 
74. To qualify for jury sewice in most states, the prospective juror must be over the age of 
eighteen, an American citizen, and able to speak and understand the English language. See ABA 
PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES AND JURY TRIALS, supra note 73, princ. 2(A) (stating that eligibility 
requirements should include being eighteen years of age, a citizen, able to communicate in the English 
language, and not a convicted felon who is serving a sentence); THE JURY PROJECT, supra note 23, at 27 
(noting similar requirements but adding that convicted felons should not be eligible, regardless of 
whether or not they are presently serving time, nor should individuals who have been summoned for 
jury duty within the past four years). Another typical eligibility requirement is that a juror cannot be 
related to one of the parties or attorneys. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Susi, 477 N.E.2d 995, 997 (Mass. 
1985) (ruling that a trial court should exclude jurors because of a relationship to one of the parties). 
75. See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text. 
76. See infra notes 76-90 and accompanying text. 
77. See, e.g., 16 ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 47(c) ("Challenges to jurors for cause in civil actions may be 
taken. . . [if there is] the existence of a state of mind evincing enmity or bias for or against either 
party."); ARK. CODE ANN. 8 16-33-304(a), (b)(2) (1987) ("The challenge for cause may be taken either 
by the state or by the defendant . . . . Particular causes of challenges are actual and implied bias."); CAL. 
C I ~ .  PROC. CODE 8 225 (2006) ("A challenge is an objection made to the trial jurors that may be taken 
by any party to the action. . . . A challenge for cause [may be taken], for one of the following reasons . 
. . . including: Implied bias-as, when the existence of the facts as ascertained, in judgment of law 
disqualifies the juror. . . ; or actual bias-the existence of a state of mind on the part of the juror in 
reference to the case, or to any of the parties, which will prevent the juror from acting with entire 
impartiality . . . ."); see also NEV. REV. STAT. 4 16.050 (1 999). 
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the statutory requirements for duty, some aspect of her background or life 
experience may lead her to actively favor one side over the other or make it 
difficult for her to approach the case dispassionately. 
Unlike peremptory challenges, for which no reason need be offered, 
challenges for cause require an attorney to demonstrate with specificity the 
prospective juror's "inability to remain fair and impartial."78 For example, 
courts will generally agree to strike a prospective juror who demonstrates a 
racial bias, whether or not he himself is aware of the bias.79 Jurors who have 
been "inflamed" by pretrial publicity or who condemn a particular party's 
lifestyle or mode of dress likewise can be stricken for cause." 
To determine if there are grounds for a challenge for cause, the parties or 
the courts1 have the opportunity to examine the prospective juror and explore 
the possibility of bias or prejudice.82 The initial examination to determine 
eligibility for jury service on a particular panel may include questions about a 
person's background, including his training and work experience. For instance, 
in Meyer v. State, the Nevada Supreme Court stated that "[dluring voir dire, 
prospective jurors may be questioned regarding any knowledge or expertise 
they may have on an issue to be tried and, based upon their responses, may be 
the subject of a peremptory or for cause challenge."s3 
While parties are free to explore background training and expertise during 
voir dire, courts, to date, have refused to find that expertise alone is sufficient 
grounds for striking a professional juror for cause. The clearest statement of 
this principle came from the New York Court of Appeals in People v. ~ r n o l d . ' ~  
In that domestic violence case, defense counsel challenged a prospective juror 
for cause after she stated during voir dire that she had studied domestic 
violence topics in college.85 She opined that her knowledge might be a 
78. 47 AM. JUR. 2D Jury $ 5  202, 228 (2005); 73A N.Y. JUR. 2D Jury 5 102 (2003); see N.Y. 
C.P.L.R. 4108 (McKinney 1992). 
79. Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986) (holding that a defendant is entitled to question 
prospective jurors about possible racial bias); see also Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the 
White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1605, 1640 (1985) (referring to data from trials showing unconscious 
bias). 
80. See, e.g., Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 529-30 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (pointing out that there may be bias against defendants who have unconventional 
hair styles). 
81. This varies from court system to court system. Some systems allow attorneys to conduct the 
voir dire of the prospective jurors; others restrict the questioning to the judge but allow the parties to 
submit proposed questions. See MARDER, supra note 10, at 74-76 (noting differences on this subject 
among jurisdictions). 
82. See Kirgis, supra note 9, at 525-26. 
83. Meyer v. State, 80 P.3d 447, 459-60 (Nev. 2003); see also State v. Mann, 39 P.3d 124, 135 
(N.M. 2002) (noting that "venire members who express experiences which would affect their ability to 
be unbiased can be dismissed through cause challenges during voir dire"). 
84. 753 N.E.2d 846 (N.Y. 2001). 
85. The court rightly questioned whether domestic violence studies were enough to qualify the 
student as an expert. Id. at 85 1. 
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"problem" and suggested she was unsure whether she could remain impartial.86 
The trial court refused to grant the challenge, declining even to ask the juror 
whether she could remain impartial. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding 
that, without an assurance of impartiality, the juror should have been struck for 
cause.87 But in so doing, it took pains to note that expertise alone would not be 
enough to strike a prospective juror for cause: 
[Olne of the goals of New York's jury reform was to eliminate all automatic 
exemptions from service, bringing to the jury room a wide array of individuals with 
specialized knowledge and training. [Our cases] should not be read as requiring the 
trial courts to automatically excuse them. 88 
Arnold concerned an individual who would not properly be considered a 
"professional juror," as her expertise was limited to courses taken as an 
undergraduate student.89 Nevertheless, the court used the case to address the 
situation of a challenge for cause based on expertise of a professional, and it 
explicitly held that no challenge for cause should be granted, even if the 
prospective juror has significant training, so long as the professional juror 
"unambiguously" and "credibly" states that, despite her expertise, she "will 
decide the case impartially and based on the e~idence."~' In other words, 
expertise alone is insufficient to justify a challenge for cause based on bias so 
long as the juror credibly affirms that his expertise is no barrier to rendering an 
impartial ~e rd ic t .~ '  Unless there is additional evidence that the prospective 
juror's expertise has caused him to develop predetermined notions of how the 
case should be resolved, he cannot be stricken for cause. 
3. Summary: The Inevitability of Professionals' Sewing on Jury Panels 
Current state and federal law is a poor filter for excluding professional 
jurors from cases touching on issues involving their expertise. Because of 
numerical limitations on peremptory challenges and because "for cause" 
challenges are not granted based on expertise alone, it is inevitable that some 
professionals will hear cases involving issues related to their expertise.92 Courts 
86. Id. at 849. 
87. Id. at 855. 
88. Id. at 854. 
89. See supra note 9 for a definition of a professional juror. 
90. Arnold, 753 N.E.2d at 851; see also Meyer v. State, 80 P.3d 447, 459 (Nev. 2003); State v. 
Mann, 39 P.3d 124, 135 (N.M. 2002) ("We do not believe that because an individual has particular 
professional experience or is well-educated one can assume that he or she is biased . . . ."). This does not 
mean that the court must take the prospective juror's word for it. The court must make a credibility 
judgment. As the Supreme Court of Arkansas stated in Walton v. State: "Some opinions and 
relationships cannot be overcome by a mere recitation by the prospective jurors that they will set aside 
objectionable factors." 650 S.W.2d 23 1,234 (Ark. 1983). 
91. See also Blank v. Hubbuch, 633 N.E.2d 439 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994) (finding that, absent bias, a 
challenge for cause to a professional is not proper). 
92. Even if, as I propose infra Part IV, the law on these challenges were altered to make it possible 
to strike professionals from panels based upon expertise alone, there are several reasons why 
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and parties, therefore, must come to terms with that reality and confront the 
second legal question professional jurors pose: Should professional jurors be 
instructed not to discuss their expertise with the rest of the jury? Moreover, 
should verdicts be set aside if professional jurors do insert their expertise into 
deliberations? Or should professional jurors be treated like all other jurors and 
be instructed that they can rely upon and discuss their prior knowledge and 
everyday experience with fellow jurors? We now turn to these questions. 
B.  Regulating Deliberations 
Courts currently have two contradictory methods of dealing with 
professional jurors who are chosen for cases in which their expertise comes 
into play. The first method, which I term the "unregulated approach," allows 
professional jurors to rely on their professional knowledge and communicate it 
to fellow jurors, even if such information is not introduced at trial.93 The only 
restraint is that the professional juror, just like any other juror, may not conduct 
experiments or otherwise bring in outside evidence.94 Under this approach, the 
professional juror is given no instruction concerning whether or not he should 
rely on or communicate his professional knowledge to his fellow jurors. 
Moreover, if the juror does communicate that knowledge during deliberations, 
it is not considered misconduct and the verdict is not subject to attack on this 
ground. Thus, under this approach a professional juror can bring his expertise 
to bear on the evidence already introduced at trial. 
The second method, which I call the "regulated approach," seeks to control 
the professional juror's use of his expertise during deliberations. A court 
employing it will generally instruct a professional juror not to communicate 
any specialized knowledge to other jurors during deliberations, even if he 
himself uses that knowledge to form an opinion about an issue that arises 
during deliberations. This creates several practical difficulties for the 
professional juror. For example, while the professional juror may use his 
expertise to develop his own opinion about the case, he is not permitted to 
professionals would still be likely to find a place in the jury box. First, when an attorney for one side 
affirmatively wants them to serve and the other side does not challenge, there would be no challenge to 
a professional juror with expertise in the relevant field. Second, an opposing attorney might be 
indifferent to the presence of professionals on the jury or may neglect to object. Finally, and as 
importantly, it is often difficult, if not impossible, to foresee what issues will emerge as critical at trial or 
what issues capture the attention of the jury during its deliberations at the outset of a case. For this 
reason, the parties may not even know that a particular expertise will play a role during deliberations 
when the respective attorneys select the definitive jury. When it dawns on the attorney that in fact juror 
expertise will be important, it will be too late to challenge the professional juror either peremptorily or 
for cause. Unavoidably, therefore, jurors with expertise are bound to sit on some juries in situations in 
which their expertise may sway the jury's decision. See infra notes 165- 169,2 10-2 1 1 and accompanying 
text. 
93. See infra notes 109-122 and accompanying text. 
94. See infra note 11 5 and accompanying text. 
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explain his vote if so doing would reveal his specialized knowledge.95 If it is 
later disclosed that the juror violated this instruction, the verdict is vulnerable 
to attack. 
In reviewing these approaches it is important to understand that neither 
permits a professional juror to independently gather information and use that 
information to assess the situation by, for instance, visiting a crime scene 
without the court's permission or independently researching a disputed fact 
involved in the litigation. Nor would it be proper under either approach for a 
professional juror to contact a third party to discuss a case.96 In this Section, I 
describe both approaches in more detail. 
1 .  The Regulated Approach 
The regulated approach directs trial judges to control the behavior of 
professional jurors in order to prevent them from injecting specialized 
knowledge into deliberations. Courts taking this approach view a professional 
juror's expertise as extraneous information, and thus jurors who introduce such 
outside evidence are viewed as having engaged in juror misconduct that 
justifies overturning a verdict. In other words, courts hewing to a regulated 
approach seek to prevent a professional juror from doing precisely what one 
might expect she would do: share her relevant life experiences with colleagues 
on the jury. It is important to note, however, that these courts do not conclude 
that professional jurors should be prevented from serving in the first place.97 
People v. Maragh, a New York ruling, is one leading example of the 
regulated approach.98 In Maragh, the defendant was charged with killing his 
girlfriend by repeatedly striking her in the abdomen, resulting in substantial 
blood loss.99 The defendant's theory of the case was that the victim's death 
resulted from natural causes brought on by an embolism, and he introduced 
expert testimony to that effect.'" Two of the jurors were nurses. Together they 
concluded that, contrary to the views of the defendant's expert, the victim's 
95. See infra note 112 and accompanying text. 
96. For a comprehensive description of the many ways in which this type of perversion of the jury 
system can occur, see Gershman, supra note 10, at 332 n.93, which describes, inter alia, third party 
contacts, exposure to extra-judicial materials, experiments, and reenactments. 
97. See, e.g., People v. Maragh, 729 N.E.2d 701 (N.Y. 2000); People v. Pizarro, 24 A.D.3d 309, 
324-25 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005). 
98. 729 N.E.2d 701. For additional cases taking this approach, see, for example, Srate v. Thacker, 
596 P.2d 508-09 (Nev. 1979), which found juror misconduct when a cattle-rancher-juror drew on his 
special knowledge of cattle weight and expressed his views during juror deliberation; State v. Scott, 819 
S.W.2d 169, 172 (Tex. App. 1991), which held improper expressions of opinion by a electrician juror 
about electrical shorts; and State v. Briggs, 776 P.2d 1347, 1352 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989), which found 
that a juror who had knowledge about stuttering and expressed his opinion during jury deliberations had 
committed juror misconduct. 
99. Maragh, 729 N.E.2d at 703. 
100. Id. 
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death could have been caused by beatings. The nurses then shared their theory 
with the jury panel.'01 The jury convicted. 
In a unanimous opinion, the New York Court of Appeals overturned the 
conviction. The court was troubled by two aspects of the nurses' conduct. First, 
the court found that, by giving their professional opinions to fellow jurors, the 
nurses became unsworn witnesses-witnesses the defendant was unable to 
confront or cross-examine.lo2 Second, the court suggested that "[olther jurors 
are likely to defer to the gratuitous injection of expertise and evaluations by 
fellow professional jurors, over and above their own everyday experiences, 
judgment and the adduced proofs at trial."'03 
The Maragh court made clear that the conviction-reversing error was not a 
result of the presence of professional jurors on the panel. Indeed, the court went 
out of its way to make clear that this holding did not mean that professionals 
should be excluded from jury service on cases that contain factual issues within 
their areas of expertise.lo4 The court praised the jury reform movement that led 
to the influx of professionals to juries and underscored that the jury reform 
process "plainly contemplates that a class of professional jurors should 
contribute their 'wisdom and life experiences to the deliberative process."'105 
According to the Maragh court, the fatal blunder occurred not when the 
nurses were empaneled, bui when they shared their opinion with the rest of the 
jury.lo6 The court identified three factors that, taken collectively, constituted 
reversible error: the nurse-jurors (1) conducted "personal specialized assessments 
not within the common ken of juror experience and knowledge" (2) "concerning 
a material issue in the case," and (3) communicated that expert opinion to the rest 
of the jury panel "with the force of private, untested truth as though it were 
e~idence."'~' Such conduct by any professional juror, the court found, would 
amount to juror misconduct and provide grounds for reversible error.Io8 
In addition to overturning the conviction, the court in Maragh imposed a 
forward-looking remedy, calling on all trial judges to instruct professional 
jurors that they "may not use their professional expertise to insert facts and 
evidence outside the record with respect to material issues into the deliberative 
process."109 As a result of Maragh, the standard New York jury instructions 
101. One nurse juror told her colleagues on the panel that, in her medical experience, the reported 
blood loss was consistent with death by beating. The other nurse on the panel "performed personal 
estimations of the blood volume loss and shared them with the rest of the jury." Id. 
102. Id. at 705. 
103. Id. at 704. 
104. Id. at 705. 
105. Id. (citing Judith Kaye, A Judge's Perspective on Juty Reformfrom the Other Side of the Jury 
Box, JUDGES' J . ,  Fall 1997, at 18, 21). 
106. Id. at 704-05. 
107. Id. at 705. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
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have been changed, and jurors are now told, per Maragh, that they may not 
draw on any professional expertise in their deliberations with their fellow 
jurors. As a result, they have essentially been enjoined from sharing their 
personal experiences and knowledge with fellow jurors. The instruction for 
civil cases tells professional jurors that "[a]lthough as jurors you are 
encouraged to use all your life experiences in analyzing testimony and reaching 
a fair verdict, you may not communicate any personal professional expertise 
you might have or other facts not in evidence to the other jurors during 
 deliberation^."^^^ For professional jurors in criminal cases the instruction is 
even stronger. In these cases professional jurors are instructed as follows: 
Some of you . . . may have something more than ordinary knowledge or experience 
in a certain area. Indeed, it may be that you have developed a special expertise in a 
certain area well beyond what an average person would have. If you have such a 
special expertise, and it relates to a material issue in this case, it would be wrong for 
you to rely on that special expertise to inject into your deliberations either a fact 
that is not in evidence or inferable from the evidence, or an opinion that could not 
be drawn from the evidence by a person without special expertise. The reason it 
would be wrong to do so is that you must decide this case only on the evidence 
presented to you in this courtroom. Therefore, with respect to any material issue in 
this case, you must not use any special expertise you have to insert into the 
deliberations evidence that has not been presented in this courtroom during the 
I I I trial. 
Support for the regulated approach is found in the writings of such 
legendary thinkers as Professors Wigmore and ~ a n s f i e l d . ~ ~ ~  Wigmore, the 
giant among evidence scholars,113 wrote that jurors should not inject any new 
fact into the deliberations.'14 He recognized just one exception to this rule: 
when "the matter in question is one upon which men in general have a common 
fund of experience and knowledge, through data notoriously accepted by 
all."11s Wigmore further cautioned that this allowance was a "narrow" one, 
strictly limited to "a few matters of elemental experience in human nature, 
110. IA N.Y. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL, supra note 11 , s  1:25A. 
l l I. Juror Expertise, supra note 15. 
112. 9 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, VIDENCE 2570 (Chadbourn Rev. 1981); John H. Mansfield, 
Jury Notice, 74 GEO. L.J. 395,407 (1985). Neither Wigmore nor Mansfield directly addressed the topic 
of how to handle professional jurors. However, their writings on jury deliberations more generally imply 
support for a regulated approach. 
1 13. See Robert P. Bums, A Wistful Retrospective on Wigmore and His Prescriptions for Illinois 
Evidence Law, 100 Nw. U .  L. REV. 131, 132-33 (2006) (refemng to Wigmore as a "magisterial 
authority" and the author of what has been "often called the greatest legal treatise produced in the 
Anglo-American world"); cf: WILLIAM R. ROALFE, JOHN HENRY WIGMORE: SCHOLAR AND REFORMER 
(1977); Donald F. Paine, Wigmore on Evidence, 39 TENN. B.J. 16 (2003). 
114. 9 WIGMORE, supra note 112, 6 2570. 
115. Id. Wigmore did not see this as a major concession, because the strict standard he set out was 
very similar to the concept of judicial notice, which allows a court to take matters of common 
knowledge in the community as proven facts. See also FED. R. EVID. 201 (Judicial Notice of 
Adjudicative Facts); 9 WIGMORE, supra note 112, 4 2570 ("From the point of view of a jury's duty 
[notice of the fund of common experience accepted by all] appears as an exception to the rule that they 
must act only upon what is presented to them at the trial."). 
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commercial affairs and everyday life."'I6 In such matters, Wigrnore said that it 
would be permissible for a party to "ask the jury to refer to their knowledge 
upon matters notorious and unquestioned," thus making it "unnecessary for the 
party to have offered evidence on the matter.""' However, Wigmore seemed to 
acknowledge that the application of this dividing line could prove difficult, 
noting, "[tlhe range of such general knowledge is not precisely definable."'18 
Professor Mansfield joined Wigmore's position, coining the phrase ''juror 
notice" to describe the limited circumstance in which jurors, in their 
deliberations, are permitted to make use of facts known to them before they 
enter the jury box and hear evidence. For Mansfield, it was permissible for 
jurors to draw on and discuss information "that a substantial number of people 
in the community have.""9 He reasoned that "[tlo require jurors to be 
completely ignorant of the world and its ways . . . would place an intolerable 
burden on the adjudicatory process."120 But Mansfield was not willing to allow 
jurors, whether professionals or not,I2' to introduce facts not known by other 
jurors into the deliberative process. To do this would violate what he called 
"fair notice."122 In other words, the parties would be unaware of the 
information affecting the jury's de1iberati0ns.l~~ Because Mansfield allowed an 
exception only for common information shared by a substantial portion of the 
community, lawyers operating under his scheme could anticipate how the jury 
would deliberate, thereby ensuring that "fair notice" would be provided.'24 
More recently, Professor Paul F. Kirgis also sided with Wigmore and 
Mansfield, arguing that once professional jurors (whom he describes as "expert 
jurors") are empanelled,'25 they should not be allowed to inject their expertise 
into the jury process. Kirgis proposed that judges enforce this rule in three 
ways: by carefully screening jurors at voir dire; by using jury instructions such 
116. 9 WIGMORE, supra note 112, 8 2570 (noting that permissible considerations include, for 
example, "the dangerousness of smoking a pipe in a barn near the straw, the conditions affecting the 
various kinds of values, [and] the intoxicating nature of a certain liquor" (citations omitted)). 
117. Id. (emphasis added). Wigmore suggests but does not explicitly say that this would come in 
the form of an instruction to the jury. 
1 18. Id. 
119. Mansfield, supra note 112, at 407. Mansfield proposed that this standard be enforced during 
jury selection, during rulings on relevance, in instructions to the jury, and in motions for new trials 
based upon juror misconduct. Id. at 4 10-1 9. 
120. Id. at 395. 
121. Like Wigmore, Mansfield never explicitly discussed the problems posed by professional 
jurors. 
122. Mansfield, supra note 112, at 397-98. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. at 397 (contrasting information about how long it takes to strangle someone to death- 
which is not shared by the community-with information about the range of vision offered by a rear 
view mirror, which is shared by the community, and stating that counsel has fair notice that the jury 
knows the latter but not the former). 
125. Kirgis would, however, allow challenges for cause to professional jurors on a standard less 
stringent than bias. Kirgis, supra note 9, at 535. 
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as those mandated by the Maragh court; and by overturning verdicts whenever 
a juror has introduced expert opinions into the deliberations and those opinions 
have had a substantial impact on the verdict.'26 While Kirgis's proposed 
solution was drastic in scope, it was far more limited in practice: his definition 
of an expert juror was quite narrow, and, as a result, many "professional jurors" 
as that term is used in this discussion would not be subject to the restrictions he 
proposed.'27 
2. The Unregulated Approach 
Courts following the unregulated approach generally allow a professional 
juror to share expertise with the rest of the jury so long as she does not 
otherwise engage in misconduct-i.e., by conducting an unauthorized 
investigation or targeted research about the case while it is sub judice. Under 
the unregulated approach, jurors are given no instruction concerning whether or 
not they are permitted to use or share professional knowledge in deliberating a 
case. Moreover, if they do use or share such expertise, the resulting verdict is 
not subject to attack on that ground. 
A representative case for this approach is State v. Mann.'28 In Mann, the 
defendant was accused of murdering his six-year-old son with a screwdriver. 
The defendant father argued that the boy had impaled himself when he tripped 
in the bathroom late at night.'29 At trial, the defendant called a physicist as an 
expert witness who testified in support of defendant's contention, concluding 
that the death was a "freakish a~c iden t . " '~~  One of the jurors who possessed a 
background in engineering and physics, performed a "fairly simple five-step 
probability cal~ulation,"'~' and based on that calculation, informed his fellow 
jurors there was only a one-in-twenty-million chance that the event transpired 
in the manner described by defendant's expert.'32 After conviction, the 
defendant moved for a new trial, arguing that this professional juror had 
improperly injected his expertise into de1iberati0ns.I~~ 
126. Id. at 535-36. 
127. See supra note 9. 
128. 39 P.3d 124 (N.M. 2002). 
129. Id. at 126. 
130. Id. 
13 1. Id. at 128 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
132. Id. 
133. This juror can be considered a professional juror as I have defined the term, as  he drew on his 
professional background in physics to provide information to his fellow jurors that aided the deliberative 
process. One jury consultant noted that "the [potential juror] may have an advanced degree in chemistry 
but be employed as a tire salesperson." JURY CONSULTANT SURVEY, supra note 6 (Respondent #22, 
Question 3). This individual would still be considered a professional juror in a case relying on principles 
of chemistry. It is important to note that more and more people are obtaining multiple degrees in 
various, seemingly unrelated fields. A professional juror may rely on information acquired in a former 
career. For a deeper discussion of the meaning of the term "professional juror" as  used in this 
discussion, see supra note 9. 
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The Supreme Court of New Mexico upheld the conviction, ruling that the 
professional juror did not engage in misconduct by making these calculations 
or sharing them with fellow jurors. The court noted that "jurors may properly 
rely on their background, including professional and educational experience, in 
order to inform their  deliberation^."'^^ The court further suggested it would be 
"inordinately bad policy" to single out for criticism a juror who had 
"thoughtfully and conscientiously engaged in deliberation," simply because he 
used his professional knowledge in doing so.'35 Finally, the court observed that 
if jury verdicts were subject to impeachment based on the grounds that a 
professional juror had improperly used his expertise in deliberations, courts 
would be improperly intruding on the privacy of jury de1iberati0ns.I~~ 
Under New Mexico's unregulated approach, courts do not seek to control 
the behavior of professional jurors. Instead, New Mexico courts give only the 
normal instructions applicable to all jurors-that they should not visit the scene 
or engage in independent research or fact-gathering about the case. Nor will 
New Mexico courts set aside verdicts based on professionals' using their 
expertise in the deliberations. Other courts have taken this approach as well, 
ruling that a professional is free to draw on her professional expertise and 
communicate it to fellow jurors during de1iberati0ns.I~~ 
,4s with the regulated approach, ihere is scholarly support for the 
unregulated position. Professor Charles ~ c ~ o r m i c k , ' ~ ~  another giant in the 
field of evidence, reasoned that, in modem America, it is impossible to make 
the presumption inherent in the WigmoreIMansfield argument-that citizens 
share a common base of knowledge: "[Iln an increasingly heterogeneous and 
highly mobile society, further fractured by class divisions, there may no longer 
exist a common fund of knowledge shared by the jurors resident in a particular 
venue."'39 Therefore, any attempt by the judiciary to regulate jury deliberations 
based on this assumption would be "questionable at best."I4O 
134. Id. at 132. 
135. Id. at 133. 
136. Id. at 135. 
137. See, e.g., State v. Aguilar, 818 P.2d 165 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (physician-juror stated during 
deliberations that, based on his professional experience, blackouts did not occur as contended); In re 
Malone, 91 1 P. 2d 468 (Cal. 1996) (psychologist-juror made statements about reliability of polygraphs); 
State v. Lawlor, 56 P.3d 863 (Mont. 2002) (professional juror explained consequences of a dmnk- 
driving conviction based on her knowledge as a college teacher); Meyer v. State, 80 P.3d 447 (Nev. 
2003) (nurse-juror stated during deliberation that small bumps on victim's head could have been caused 
by hair-pulling); Borroum v. State, 8 S.W. 2d 153 (Tex. Crim. App. 1927) (juror, who was in the Army, 
expressed opinion about the effect on the decedent of a shot by the accused); Richards v. Overlake 
Hosp. Med. Ctr., 796 P.2d 737 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (occupational therapist-juror stated, during 
deliberations, that a child's birth defects were caused by the mother's flu and not medical malpractice); 
State v. Heitkemper, 538 N.W. 2d 561 (Wisc. Ct. App. 1995) (pharmacist-juror gave his opinion about 
effect of a drug on the witness). 
138. 2 MCCORMICKON EVIDENCE, 5 329 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999). 
139. Id. 
140. Id. McCormick noted Mansfield's proposition that Wigmore's common fund idea be enacted 
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Professor Richard Fraher also supported the unregulated approach.14' He 
argued that because juries are selected from a broadly representative sample of 
diverse populations, individual jurors can not and should not be weeded out 
because they have specialized information not shared by the majority of others 
who are likely to serve as jurors in a particular case. For this reason, he argued 
that jurors should be allowed to bring their own experiences and knowledge 
into the jury de1iberati0ns.I~~ To do otherwise, he suggested, would run counter 
not only to the goal of obtaining a representative jury, but also to Supreme 
Court holdings in cases like Taylor v. Louisiana that opened jury service to 
women and min~r i t i e s . ' ~~  
C. Summary 
Under current law, jurors with professional training, even those who 
possess expertise in a field dealt with at trial, cannot be kept off juries simply 
because of their expertise. However, there is a split about what to do when 
professionals are chosen as jurors. One school of thought holds, as did the 
Maragh court, that professionals should check their professional knowledge 
base at the door.144 They may draw on their training and experience in reaching 
their own conclusions, but they may not share this knowledge with their fellow 
jurors. The other school of thought permits professionals who are chosen for 
jury duty to share their special knowledge with their colleagues on the jury, as 
long as they do not engage in outside research, inspection, or other forms of 
jury misconduct. 
To date this debate, at least in scholarly circles, has proceeded without 
consultation with experts in jury deliberations. For this reason, I sought the 
views of professional jury selection consultants. What they had to say is 
revealing and interesting. The next Part deals with their responses. 
and preserved by courts through voir dire practices, jury instructions, and responses to motions for a 
new trial. McCormick rejected the proposition as  coming "out of academe." Id. He suggested that 
lawyers will resist employing the common fund concept. Id. ("The parameters of the jury fund of 
common data may be vague precisely because trial lawyers find themselves embarrassed to insist upon 
bright-line rules when they themselves regularly employ summations to expose jurors to non-evidence 
facts masquerading as rhetorical hypothesis. What with voir dire examinations and challenges being 
available to exclude from juries anyone privy to information in excess of the local common 
denominator, any eccentric scenarios which do occur may simply be chalked up to self-inflicted 
hardship upon the part of counsel." (citation omitted)). 
141. Richard M. Fraher, Adjudicative Facts, Non-Evidence Facts and Permissible Juror 
Background Information, 62 IND. L.J. 333, 346-47 (1987). 
142. Id. at 347. 
143. See id. at 353 ("Our constitutional jurisprudence takes very seriously, at least on a theoretical 
level, the notion that this 'judgment of the community' must be pronounced by jurors drawn from a 
cross-section of society, without systematic discounting of minority voices . . . . Both the appearance of 
justice and the substantive functions of the jury require the law to protect the operation of the jury 
against overreaching judicial intrusions."). 
144. At least to the extent that they might communicate ideas from that knowledge base to their 
juror colleagues. 
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In recent years litigators, including those in high-profile cases,'45 have 
increasingly turned to consultants for assistance in choosing juries that will be 
favorable to their cases.'46 These consultants, who make a living-and indeed 
are often handsomely paid for-advising parties how to choose juries, are 
necessarily well-versed students of the jury system.147 And, as one might 
expect, they have thoughts and insights on the role professional jurors do--and 
should-play. To be sure, jury consultants have a unique perspective: their 
primary interest is in empanelling a jury favorable to their clients and not 
necessarily in finding the best or fairest jury in any general sense. For this 
reason, many consultants may desire to retain flexibility in the law because 
doing so gives them a tool with which to aid their clients in the selection of the 
jury that they want. Nevertheless, because jury consultants are by the nature of 
their work students of the jury process, their insights are valuable. To date, 
however, those insights have not been incorporated into scholarly discussion of 
the topic. 
To explore jury consultants' views of the role of professional jurors, I sent 
a questionnaire to all publicly listed members of the American Association of 
Trial ~ o n s u l t a n t s . ' ~ ~  The questionnaire asked respondents to address, first, 
145. Jury consultants have helped pick juries in some of the most publicized cases of the past 
decade. For instance, Howard Varinsky picked the jury that convicted Martha Stewart. Renowned jury 
consultant Jo-Ellan Dimitrius helped select the jury that acquitted Michael Jackson of his 2005 child 
molestation charges. See Troy Roberts, 48 Hours Mystery: The Jury Consultants In High-Profile Cases, 
Human-Behavior Experts Run The Show, (June 2, 2004), http://www.cbsnews.com/ 
stories/2004/06/02/48hours/main620794.shtd; see also Deidre Silva, Specialized Skills Assist Attornqys 
in Jury Selection, PUGET SOUND BUS. J., Aug. 5,2005, available at http://www.bizjournals.com/seattlel 
stories/2005/08/08/focus17.htrnl. 
146. Although jury consultants were first used in highly political trials in the 1970s, they have 
become commonplace in both civil and criminal trials. Maureen E. Lane, Note, Twelve Carefully 
Selected Not so Angry Men: Are Jury Consultants Destroying the American Legal System?, 32 SUFFOLK 
U .  L. REV. 463, 463 (1999). Having grown rapidly over the past two decades, the jury consultation 
industry now provides a wide variety of services, ranging from selecting the jury to actual trial strategy. 
Id. at 463. In particular, jury consultants conduct "community attitude surveys, juror investigations, in- 
court assessment of juror nonverbal behavior, group dynamic analysis, focus groups, mock trials, and 
shadow juries," in order to predict the outcome of a case and to advise attorneys on the best way to 
present evidence at trial. Id. at 472; see also MARDER, supra note 10, at 101-04; John W. Clark 111, The 
Utility ofJury Consultants in the Twenty-First Century, 42 CRIM. L. BULL. 3 (2006). 
147. The jury consulting business is a "booming industry." See Developments in the Law, Jury 
Selection and Composition, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1443, 1463 (1997). Jury consultants use a range of 
social science techniques, including focus groups, mock juries, community attitude surveys, and 
"shadow juries" to determine what might be the most favorable jury for their clients as well as how to 
influence the jury chosen. Id. at 1463-65. Consultants using these techniques maintain that they are able 
to predict "with greater than ninety percent certitude the outcome of trials before the evidence has been 
heard." Jeremy W. Barber, The Jury is Still Out: The Role of Jury Science in the Modern American 
Courtroom, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1225, 1232 (1994). 
148. The American Association of Trial Consultants is the leading trade organization in the field. 
For more information on the Association and its membership, see Am. Soc'y of Trial Consultants, 
hap://www.astcweb.org/content/File/06-07%2OApp%2OSepte02OPages.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 
2007). 
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whether they had encountered professional jurors on cases in which they 
worked; second, whether they thought that it was possible to structure the 
system so as to eliminate professional jurors from serving in cases touching on 
their expertise; and third, whether, if they did serve, these jurors were 
influential in the jury's de1iberati0ns.I~~ I received twenty-nine completed 
responses. 150 
Although the results were not scientifically gathered or conclusive,'51 they 
are nevertheless revealing for two reasons. First, they suggest broader trends 
and views among jury consultants. Second the written responses provide rich 
anecdotal evidence to support many of the problems and solutions to those 
problems discussed in this ~ r t i c 1 e . l ~ ~  
Their responses, based on their personal experiences, suggest three general 
trends. First, professionals do, in fact, often sit on jury panels in cases 
involving their expertise. Second, professionals cannot entirely be prevented 
fiom serving on juries considering matters within their expertise. Third, 
professional jurors can play a critical role in jury deliberations. I explore those 
responses in greater detail below. 
A. Professionals Are Sitting on Jury Panels in Cases Involving Their 
Expertise 
The survey results provided strong first-hand evidence that professionals 
often serve as jurors in cases in which their areas of expertise coincide with 
disputed issues. The majority of respondents reported they had been personally 
149. The survey also sought information about whether the law regarding professional jurors 
should be changed to allow challenges for cause or to abolish the gagging of professional jurors. The 
full text of the questionnaire, along with the compiled results, is reproduced infra Appendix. The 
originals are on file with the author. 
150. The survey was sent to the 116 members of the Association listed on its web site in July 2004. 
Responses were received from 29, for a response rate of 25%. The questions and the tabulation of the 
responses to each are set out in full in Appendix, and the originals are on file with the author. 
15 1. The survey was comprised of ten yestno questions, three of which had subparts, each followed 
by a space for unstructured response and explanation. This format proved advantageous in many 
respects. It offered busy professionals a relatively painless way to respond (although, as it turns out, 
many voluntarily chose to write detailed explanations to their yeslno responses). More importantly, the 
format gave these experts-who are likely to view t i a l  strategy as a highly nuanced matter-a chance to 
frame issues in their own terms, rather than in terms preconceived by the researcher. Thus, although the 
survey did not produce complex statistical data, it likely produced more robust data than would have 
been possible through a more structured, numerical survey. The small number of potential respondents 
likewise made this method preferable. As to the response rate, there is no way to know whether the 
characteristics of those who responded are representative of the organization. However, there does not 
appear to have been a significant self-selection bias, because respondents were divided over contentious 
questions such as whether to challenge professional jurors for cause, see infra notes 209-220 and 
accompanying text, but largely united over equally contentious questions such as whether the Maragh 
instruction is appropriate, see infra notes 226-241 and accompanying text. All respondent names have 
been kept confidential. 
152. Many respondents took the time to write extensive comments to the survey questions, as  they 
were invited to do. I set out many of the relevant portions of those responses in this Section. 
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involved in such cases.'53 Several respondents indicated that they believed this 
to be a common occurrence in American trials. As one respondent noted: "Over 
the past 25 years, I have participated in probably several hundred cases as 
either a trial lawyer or a trial consultant where a juror has some experience in 
the technical issue in the case."154 Another commented that professionals sit on 
"too many cases to list."'55 Still another stated that "[iln every IP case tried in 
Santa Clara County, there are several jurors in the pool with 
sciencelengineering backgrounds."'56 
According to the survey responses, professional jurors sat in all sorts of 
civil and criminal cases. Consider the following examples respondents offered: 
a pediatrician sitting in a capital murder case involving medical 
evidence; 157 
an insurance claims representative serving in an insurance case; 158 
engineers serving in a concrete saw safety case; 159 
a tort law professor sitting in a tort case; 160 
"jurors [who] had experience in reviewing or creating contracts" sitting in 
a "high level contracts" case; 161 
a junior grade civil engineer sitting on a jury in a railroad crossing fatality 
case that turned on evidence relating to the engineering of safety devices 
162 
at railroad crossings; 
an "[olil company worker who worked off shore on a rig sitting on a case 
about how an oil company moves oil";'63 and 
nurses in medical malpractice cases. 164 
B. Professionals Cannot Wholly Be Prevented from Sewing on Juries in 
Cases that Involve Their Expertise 
The consultants' responses to the survey strongly suggest that it is very 
difficult to purge professional jurors from cases touching on their areas of 
expertise.'65 That difficulty lies in the fact that, as some respondents observed, 
153. The full text of the survey, as well as the compiled results are reproduced infra Appendix. 
154. JLTRY CONSULTANT SURVEY, supra note 7 (Respondent #26, Question 1). One respondent 
asserted that "[mlany professional liability cases (i.e., product liability, medical malpractice, contractor 
liability, admiralty, etc.) are heard by jurors with some expertise andlor experience in the related fields." 
Id. (Respondent #14, Question 1). 
155. Id. (Respondent #18, Question 1). 
156. Id. (Respondent #25, Question 1). 
157. Id. (Respondent #2, Question 1). 
158. Id. (Respondent #3, Question 1). 
159. Id. (Respondent #5, Question 1). 
160. Id. (Respondent #9, Question 1). 
161. Id. (Respondent #17, Question 1). 
162. Id. (Respondent #26, Question 1). 
163. Id. (Respondent #I ,  Question 1). 
164. Id. (Respondent #9, Question 1). 
165. Although a majority of respondents thought that challenges for cause ought to succeed, only 
55% of respondents thought that expert jurors realistically could be screened out using challenges for 
cause and peremptory challenges. See Jury Consultant Survey-Final Results, reproduced infru 
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"even under the best voir dire circumstances," it can be difficult to detect 
professional expertise that might be relevant to the case.166 Respondents 
suggested at least three reasons why identifying such expertise can be difficult. 
First, restrictive voir dire practices may make it hard to delve into a potential 
juror's expertise. For example, one respondent explained, "the [potential juror] 
may have an advanced degree in chemistry, but be employed as a tire 
salesperson."'67 Second, as one jury consultant noted, some jurors "are very 
secretive," making it hard to discover their expertise no matter how careful the 
selection process.168 Third, even when professional jurors do not try 
deliberately to conceal their expertise, it might nevertheless remain undisclosed 
because "prospective jurors may or may not understand what technical 
expertise would come into play and inquiry during the voir dire may or may not 
reveal what expertise a juror will bring to a case. Even under the best voir dire 
conditions, it is difficult to assess expertise . . . . 9,169 
C. Professional Jurors Can Play a Critical Role in Jury Deliberations 
The jury consultants who responded to the survey also reported their belief 
that professionals who sit on jury panels play an important, often pivotal, role 
in jury deliberations. They offered numerous examples of cases in which they 
believed professional jurors swayed the jury's de1iberati0ns.l~~ For example, 
one consultant described a capital murder case in which medical testimony was 
critical. The consultant claimed that, after the close of the case, he learned that 
a pediatrician sitting on the jury believed the medical evidence did not support 
the State's case and "convinced seven other jurors during the deliberations" to 
Appendix A (Question 4) [hereinafter Survey-Final Results]. A solid 41% stated that it was not 
realistic to think this goal could be achieved. Id. Moreover, on examining the responses, it is unclear 
whether the 55% who thought that professionals could be removed were talking about particular cases 
or the system as a whole. 
166. Id. (Respondent #6, Question 4). Another respondent said much the same thing, opining that it 
was "[nlot black and white in many cases" whether or not the expertise of a juror will become relevant 
to the deliberations. Id. (Respondent #6, Question 2). 
167. Id. (Respondent #22, Question 3); see also id. (Respondent #28, Question 4) ("Most people 
have the potential to become a 'perceived expert' depending on the nature of the case and the nature of 
the jurors' expertise."). In fact, in response to the survey question, "would you prefer a jury of highly 
educated individuals that may be better able to grasp the subject matter," 52% said yes. Survey-Final 
Results, supra note 165 (Question 9). 
168. Id. (Respondent #5, Question 4). 
169. Id. (Respondent #6, Question 4); see also id. (Respondent #29, Question 4) (stating that the 
system can't exclude everyone who has "expertise" in some areas); id. (Respondent #15, Question 4) 
("[llf the potential juror is a neurosurgeon, has years of experience and admits to how his profession is 
affected by lawsuits, the likelihood for a challenge [for] cause arise. However, if the potential juror 
works in a hospital, but as an administrative assistant, illustrating how her work experience has affected 
her view of medical malpractice cases could be harder to prove."); id. (Respondent #17, Question 4) ("It 
would be impossible to draw the line at how much expertise created an expert. Some people. . . were 
expert by virtue of their own studies."). 
170. The survey did not ask respondents to report whether or not these jurors were given any 
special jury instructions not to share their expertise with fellow jurors during deliberations. 
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vote to acquit.I7' Another jury consultant described a case in which a diesel 
mechanic used his knowledge in a manner that "controlled the case."'72 One 
wrote that she had been involved in a patent infringement case in which a juror 
with a finance background was the "driving force in developing a strategy for 
analyzing the damages."'73 
The responses suggested the basis for the problem is not just that 
professionals would share their expertise. Rather, the concern was that the 
expertise itself would lend the professional juror an air of authority that could 
prove decisive in deliberations. There is "always a 'risk' that the expert juror 
will be the leader in deliberations," one respondent suggested. "Other jurors 
will look to them because of their expertise."'74 This sentiment was echoed by 
another respondent, who wrote that "[rlegardless of the extent and accuracy of 
their expertise such 'experts' will be looked to by other jury members for their 
knowledge.""5 
In sum, the survey of jury consultants provides strong support for the 
notion that professionals do serve in cases touching on their expertise. Despite 
careful attempts at screening professionals out, it is virtually impossible, under 
existing law, to eliminate all such jurors from serving or playing an oversized 
role in deliberations. 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The demise of occupational exemptions is a welcome development. The 
elimination of exemptions has spread the responsibility for jury duty more 
fairly throughout the population and given true meaning to the "fair cross 
section" requirement imposed by the Constitution. After all, well before the 
jury reforms of the 1990s, jury duty was understood to be the obligation of all 
American citizens.176 But while the elimination of occupational exemptions has 
171. JURY CONSULTANT SURVEY, supra note 7 (Respondent #2, Question 1) (suggesting that not 
all of the jurors were persuaded by the pediatrician, and noting that the trial resulted in a hung jury). 
172. Id. (Respondent #5, Question 1). 
173. Id. (Respondent #6, Question 1); see also id. (Respondent #25, Question 1) ("[Tlhe risk is too 
high that a juror's knowledge" will give the juror "disproportionate influence on other jurors and the 
outcome of the case."). 
174. Id. (Respondent #I 5, Question 2). 
175. Id. (Respondent #20, Question 2); see also id. (Respondent #21, Question 2) ("Everyone else 
will listen to them and if they are not correct you are dead." (emphasis added)); id. (Respondent #8, 
Question 2) (stating that an expert "tips the scales"); Id. (Respondent #7, Question 2) (stating that an 
expert juror may become foreperson, and that expert jurors "have increased influence on deliberations"); 
id. (Respondent #6, Question 6) ("In patent cases, in particular, where technical issues come into play, 
technical expertise can be influential."); id. (Respondent #7, Question 7) ("Jurors naturally look to the 
expert for leadership, even if expert didn't share basis of position."); id. (Respondent #9, Question 3) 
("There is no way to keep your personal experience From your thought process and it is very difficult not 
to influence other jurors if they become aware of your experience."). 
176. See, e.g., Thiel v. S .  Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 224 (1946) ("Jury service is a duty as well as a 
privilege of citizenship; it is a duty that cannot be shirked . . . ."); see also MARLIER, supra note 1 1 ,  at 13 
("[Jlury service is a badge of  citizenship."). A recent study indicates that modem juries have more 
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been a positive development, it has raised a difficult challenge for the 
American legal system: how should professional jurors be integrated into jury 
service? As many have suspected, as case law suggests, and as the survey of 
jury consultants confirms, professional jurors can play a pivotal role in 
deliberations when they sit in cases that implicate their areas of expertise.177 
In confronting the challenges posed by professional jurors, current judicial 
approaches simultaneously do too little and far too much. They do too little by 
not allowing parties to challenge for cause professional jurors whose 
professional backgrounds intersect with an issue or issues in the case. As a 
result, they permit too many professionals to serve on juries in cases in which 
there is strong reason to suspect their presence will threaten the fairness of a 
trial. Meanwhile, in jurisdictions that adopt the "regulated approach" and 
attempt to "gag" professional jurors, the courts simultaneously do far too much. 
Gagging instructions rob professional jurors of the ability to participate fully 
and meaningfully in jury deliberations. For this reason the instructions are not 
only unfair, they are-as several of the surveyed jury consultant experts 
pointed out-unenforceable, impractical, and may even have unintended 
effects on the de1iberati0ns.I~~ As a result, professional jurors are liable to end 
up "bound and gagged"-bound, that is, to serve on cases in which their 
specialized knowledge is implicated, but prevented from using that knowledge 
openly or effectively. 
I propose the paradigm be reversed. Rather than indiscriminately opening 
the jury box to professionals, as the current law does, courts should expand the 
range of permissible uses for challenges for cause and require trial judges to 
strike professional jurors whose expertise alone renders their service improper. 
Conversely, courts should remove the muzzle imposed on professional jurors 
who nevertheless do find themselves empanelled on cases involving their 
expertise. 
Though at first glance these two proposals may appear to be in tension, 
they are not. Challenges for cause are the only way to effectively screen 
professional jurors from cases in which they may have unwarranted and undue 
influence. But once a juror finds his way on to a panel, a gagging instruction is 
likely to be ineffective and may actually undermine the deliberative process. 
These proposals treat the problem at its root but refrain from imposing a cure 
that is worse than the disease. 
educated people sewing on them than was previously thought. Jury duty, it seems, is becoming an 
obligation that well educated people are not escaping. Levin & Emerson, supra note 26, at 327-28. 
177. We do not know the exact dimensions of the phenomenon. As discussed supra note 22, more 
research is needed on the impact of  professional jurors on jury deliberations. 
178. For a summary of  the jury consultant's views on these subjects, see infra notes 236-239 and 
accompanying text. Because it may prove impossible for professional jurors to follow the Maragh 
instruction even if they desire to, the standard legal presumption that jurors follow instructions, see, e.g., 
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 740 (1991), is misplaced here. 
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A. Challenges for Cause Should Be Expanded To Include a Challenge for 
Cause Based on Expertise Alone 
The law should be changed so that professional expertise touching on an 
essential trial issue would, in and of itself, be sufficient cause to strike a 
179 prospective juror. This would be a major change. Current law requires more 
than just the confluence of a prospective juror's professional expertise and the 
issues in the case at hand before a trial court generally will grant a challenge 
for cause. For the challenge to succeed, the professional must admit to, or be 
demonstrated to suffer from, a bias toward one side or the other, such that the 
juror could not be impartial.'80 The case law and available data suggest that 
under this approach, professional jurors often find their way onto panels on 
which their status affords them undue influence over trial outcomes.'s~ My first 
proposal, then, is meant to remedy the very real possibility that professional 
jurors routinely exert undue influence over trial outcomes. 
The proposal, however, is subject to the criticism that it will be difficult for 
courts to define and identify "professional" jurors. Admittedly, creating a 
bright line test that is readily applicable in all cases would prove difficult. To 
implement my proposal, courts will need to flesh out the contours of the term. 
But that does not mean that courts are totally at sea in making this 
determination, nor is it beyond the ability of the judiciary to craft a workable 
set of guidelines. Courts often are called upon to make even more difficult 
judgments.Is2 
Certainly if the juror's area of expertise touches on a topic that one party 
intends to call an expert witness to address, that juror should be considered a 
professional juror for that particular case and subject to challenge. That rule 
179. I am not the first legal commentator to make a recommendation of this kind. Kirgis argues that 
"judges can and should play a role at this [the voir dire] stage by granting challenges for cause in cases 
where a juror's expertise clearly encroaches upon material issues in the case." Kirgis, supra note 10, at 
535. However, Kirgis' recommendations are limited to professionals who would qualify as expert 
witnesses under the Federal Rules of Evidence. As I have argued throughout, this definition is too 
narrow. See, e.g., supra note 9; infra notes 181-190 and accompanying text. For others recommending 
challenges for cause to professionals, see Fisher, supra, note 19; and Moore & Gaier, supra note 17 at 4 
(arguing that medical personnel should be challenged for cause on medical malpractice cases). 
180. For a discussion of the law regarding challenges to professional jurors for cause, see supra 
notes 76-96 and accompanying text. 
181. See, e.g., People v. Arnold, 753 N.E.2d 846 (N.Y. 2001) (noting that expertise alone would 
not be sufficient grounds for a challenge for cause); see also infra notes 192-208 and accompanying text 
(discussing the views ofjury consultants). 
182. CJ Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 186 (1977) (noting the difficulty but not impossibility of 
developing intelligible standards for determining when a defendant has "minimum contacts" with a 
forum state for the purposes of asserting jurisdiction over that defendant); see also Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 n.10 (2004) (noting that when a court announces a new standard and does 
not provide a comprehensive definition there will be "interim uncertainty" until subsequent court 
decisions fill in the blanks); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concuning) 
("[Tlhe judicial power is often difficult in its exercise."); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150 (1983) 
(noting that although it is "difficult" to apply the First Amendment to a case involving employee speech, 
the court must make the effort). 
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should apply even if the juror would not qualify as an expert himself. For 
example, the nurses in Maragh had expertise in the area involved in the case 
and were credentialed. Even though it is doubtful that they had enough 
experience or training to be qualified as expert witnesses,lS3 they should 
nevertheless be considered professional jurors. 
It is hard for lay jurors to overcome professional expertise as thus defined. 
As one professional who served on a jury reflected immediately after her 
experience, it is hard for lay jurors not to "honor [the professional juror's] 
opinion as the ~ o s ~ e 1 . " ' ~ ~  Hence, the determinative question is not whether a 
juror possesses merely unique knowledge; the issue is what the likely effect of 
that knowledge will be on jurors who do not have it. If the juror with outside 
knowledge is a professional, then we know the odds are high that the jury will 
accord that knowledge undue weight, and hence the prospective juror should be 
stricken. 
This does not mean, however, that this "novel use of the challenge for 
cause"lS5 will allow challenges for cause in any case in which a juror has 
unique knowledge. This is not the intention of the proposal. Indeed, there is a 
critical difference between a layperson's idiosyncratic knowledge and a 
professional's expertise. Professional jurors, as I use the term, have acquired 
specialized knowledge based on training and experience. That training, in turn, 
conveys an entitlement to enhanced credibility. Therefore, it is likely that in 
most cases the professional will be credentialed-his expertise, in other words, 
will have been previously recognized by some body that licenses or regulates 
professionals. 
Professional knowledge is generally backed by an institutional imprimatur 
(why else do professionals frame and hang degrees?). Indeed, professional 
knowledge is deliberately-and often elaborately-constructed as differing 
qualitatively from the knowledge achievable through life experience alone. 
Moreover, professional expertise is typically linked with social standing and 
prestige. For these reasons, professional jurors acting as unsworn witnesses 
183. See generally Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (describing 
the standard for admitting expert testimony at trial). 
184. Susan M. Karten, Letter to the Editor, Lawyers as Jurors: Not Such a Good Idea, N.Y.L.J., 
July 25, 2006, at 2. Sometimes professional jurors themselves are aware of their influence and take steps 
to minimize it. For example, an acquaintance of mine is a distinguished, silver-haired Mississippi 
attorney. Last year, he was called for jury duty and empanelled. As deliberations began, his fellow jurors 
asked him what to do. As my acquaintance tells the story, he knew this was an important moment. If he 
said so much as a single word about the case, jury deliberations would be over before they began. So 
instead he told his companions to deliberate without him and that when they had an idea about what the 
right result was to let him know. They did as he asked, and after a few hours of deliberations reported 
back to him. He agreed with their proposed result and the jury, now unanimous, returned to the 
courtroom to deliver its verdict without the professional juror's ever uttering a word about the evidence 
in the case. 
185. Kirgis, supra note 10, at 535. 
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pose a greater risk than lay witnesses with specialized knowledge.'86 
On the other hand, unique knowledge possessed by nonprofessional jurors 
is both a readily distinguishable and a wholly desirable part of the jury system. 
Indeed, ideally a jury pools the community's experiences and wisdom in order 
to determine critical issues at trial-this is one of the anchoring visions of late- 
twentieth-century jury reform. The jury system has power largely because 
jurors do bring unique and differing sets of life experiences to the table. By 
definition, these life experiences contain some sort of specialized knowledge in 
the sense that other jurors who have not had these experiences do not share that 
knowledge.'87 
Indeed, depictions of jury deliberations in popular culture demonstrate how 
drawing on this kind of personal knowledge can dramatically alter a trial's 
outcome. Twelve Angry   en,'^^ for example, focused on a jury's deliberation 
in a murder case involving a young Latino defendant in the late 1950s. Several 
jurors use examples drawn from their unique personal backgrounds and 
experiences to persuade fellow jury members that the prosecution's witnesses 
are not credible, thereby changing the fate of a defendant facing the death 
penalty from near certain conviction to sudden acquittal. During the course of 
deliberations, Juror Number Eight tells his colleagues about the acoustics of 
New York City tenement apartments and what can and cannot be heard through 
the walls.Ig9 Juror Number Five describes for his colleagues the angle at which 
thugs stab people with switchblade knives.lgO In a sense, these jurors were 
acting as unsworn witnesses. But as the story so powerfully demonstrates, their 
use of their own specialized knowledge is a critical and inherent part of the jury 
system itself. It is neither possible nor desirable to have a system in which 
human beings are asked to decide contested issues of fact without the 
possibility that they will draw on their own past experiences to accomplish the 
task. As a wise judge once said, "It would be naive to suggest that individual 
jurors leave all their preconceptions, values, and insights on the doorstep when 
they enter the jury room. Indeed, we encourage jurors to bring their experiences 
to bear during deliberati~n."'~' 
186. See Levin & Emerson, supra note 26, at 334. 
187. For an extensive catalog of examples, see Shipley, supra note 19. 
188. REGINALD ROSE, TWELVE ANGRY MEN: A PLAY M THREE ACTS (1955). Twelve Angry Men 
was originally broadcast on television on CBS on September 20, 1954, and was made into a film in 
1957. TWELVE ANGRY MEN (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1957); see also Phoebe C .  Ellsworth, One 
Inspiring Jury, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1387, 1388 (2003) ("The jury in Twelve Angry Men is the 
embodiment of this ideal, the jury at its finest."). 
189. ROSE, supra note 188, at 34. 
190. Id. at 61. Of course there are other aspects to this famous story that are not quite as pure. For 
example, one juror produces an exact replica of the murder weapon that he purchased and then brought 
into the jury room. Id. at 23. This is exactly the type of outside experimentation and evidence that ought 
to be prohibited, regardless of whether or not a professional is gagged. 
191. See Bulger v. McClay, 575 F.2d 407, 412 (2d Cir. 1978) (Kaufman, C.J.); see also Ellsworth, 
supra note 188, at 1407 (endorsing the view that all jurors have different life experiences, perspectives, 
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The change advocated for here accords with the detailed jury consultant 
feedback, which suggests that the respondents would advise clients to seek to 
strike professional jurors.192 One consultant used particularly colorful language 
to make the point: "I would ask the attorneys to raise bloody hell about such a 
juror even i f  I thought they would tend to be on our side. jury selection is an 
art; it is not Las Vegas slot machine in my opinion. Expert jurors are less 
predictable than lay people."193 
And the majority of respondents said that when a professional serves in a 
case implicating her area of expertise, the professional usurps the role of the 
expert witness.194 One respondent who felt strongly about the issue noted that: 
[Elxpert jurors have the potential of becoming the critiquers/reviewers of fact. The 
other jurors would look to them as the expert. I have seen it happen many times 
during mock trials. If jurors do not know who to believe, they will look to a fellow 
jury member, who has either the education or experience, for guidance. 195 
Another made a similar point, arguing that "it isn't fair to either side" when 
a professional juror serves in a case involving her expertise.196 "[The case] 
should be decided on the merits of fact and . . . not by someone 'who [the other 
jurors] may feel [is] . . . an expert.""97 Many consultants expressed 
and even biases-few are blessed (or cursed) with a sterile "impartiality"-and that the 
counterbalancing and juxtaposition of these different points of view results in a jury that is "far more 
thorough, more accurate, and more fair than a jury o f  twelve impartial clones could ever hope to be"). 
192. Survey-Final Results, supra note 165 (Question 3). One should approach this result with 
caution. From analyzing the responses, it is apparent that many of the respondents did not understand 
this to be a normative question. That is, an undetermined number of respondents may have answered 
this question in the affirmative, not necessarily because they believed that the law should be changed so 
as to allow challenges for cause based solely on a juror's expertise, but rather because they believed 
that, in reality, a trial judge would do so regardless of the appellate court's standard. See, e.g., JURY 
CONSULTANT SURVEY, supra note 6 (Respondent #24, Question 2) ("[You mlust go for a cause 
challenge because the expert will not be cross examined . . . . [It's a]n unfair advantage."); id. 
(Respondent #I ,  Question 2) ("[Bletter not to gamble, always try for cause. . . . If you are wrong [about 
the expert] you lose for sure."); id. (Respondent #2, Question 3) ("Most experts have come to the point 
where their experiences have led to [this] opinion. Opinion can often be bias . . . ."). 
193. Id. (Respondent #22, additional comments). 
194. Id. (Question 10). 
195. Id. (Respondent #15, Question 10); see also id. (Respondent #3, Question 10) ("[I have 
learned] through many focus groups and mock trials [that] this is a common occurrence when 'experts' 
are on the panel."); id. (Respondent #18, Question 10) ("I've seen it happen over and over. Not only do 
they express opinions--other jurors weigh their opinions as more persuasive."); id. (Respondent #23, 
Question 10) ("This is especially a concern if the juror disagrees with the expert."); id. (Respondent #25, 
Question 10) ("[I] would be more womed the expert juror would introduce and influence others with 
hisiher own theory of the case."); id. (Respondent # I ,  Question 10) ("It happens all the time! I would bet 
money on it."); id. (Respondent #12, Question 10) ("If a jury were truly comprised of peers-i.e., if a 
police ofticer were tried by a panel of all police officers; a truck driver charged with DWI tried by all 
truck drivers; a pharmacist charged with diluting meds tried by all pharmacists-then okay; but 
othenvise I am afraid of 'expert jurors' as I am of 'stealth' jurors.); id. (Respondent #7, Question 10) 
("In an era when jurors allowed to take notedask questions, expert juror role even more pronounced."); 
id. (Respondent #9, Question 3) ("There is no way to keep your personal experience from your thought 
process and it is very difficult not to influence other jurors if they become aware of your experience."). 
196. Id. (Respondent #2 I, Question 3). 
197. Id. (Respondent #2 1, Question 3); see also id. (Respondent # 15, Question 9) ("[Alt times, the 
more 'expert' jurors have stronger opinions and critique the information too much causing them to miss 
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apprehension that professional jurors essentially become witnesses-but 
witnesses who cannot be cross-examined.I9' For this reason, one jury 
consultant stated that it is better not to "gamble."199 In the words of yet another, 
"[olne can never be certain whether the 'expert' will be for you or against you, 
and I would hate for them to be against me."200 Such comments underscore the 
risk that nonprofessional jurors may consider a professional juror's opinion 
sacrosanct, and that they will "take the of the professional juror, even 
if at trial one of the parties presented a credible expert witness with a contrary 
point of view.202 
Not all respondents entirely supported the position I have staked out 
here.203 Some felt that, "[elxpertise alone will not bias a juror and even can 
help them understand highly technical issues."204 Others even saw a positive 
virtue in having professionals serve on juries in which their expertise was 
involved. One suggested that in complicated cases involving dueling experts, 
the message."). 
198. See id. (Question 10). 
199. Id. (Respondent #1, Question 2) 
200. Id. (Respondent #20, Question 2). It is not surprising, then, that the majority of respondents 
said they would advise their clients to challenge-through s peremptov challenge or a challenge for 
cause-a prospective juror with expertise in subject matter relevant to the trial. Id. (Question 2). 
201. Id. (Respondent #lo, Question 7). 
202. This accords, not incidentally, with the findings of social psychologist Stanley Milgram in his 
classic "shock experiments." See STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL 
VIEW (1974). In that seminal work Milgram found that-when human subjects were asked to administer 
harmful or even potentially fatal shocks to other humans, simply in order to participate in what the 
subjects believed was an experiment concerning memory and cognition-they routinely deferred to 
direction provided by an "experimenter" in a white lab coat. The results cut across class and gender 
lines. One of the most striking findings from the Milgram study was the power of the experimenter in 
the white lab coat (i.e., "the professional"). Milgram's work, of course, does not prove that 
nonprofessional jurors will be blindly deferential to professional jurors. The interaction between 
professionals and lay individuals constitutes its own complex field of study, and there are glaring 
differences between the Milgram test and the jury room scenario. However, the Milgram experiment 
does provide an interesting insight into how, when one individual is set up as an expert during a 
sustained face-to-face interaction with a nonexpert, that "professional" can wield considerable influence. 
203. Survey-Final Results, supra note 165 (Question 3). A sizable minority (38%) thought that a 
challenge for cause on this basis could not be granted and probably would not be granted. For those who 
agreed with my position (59%), explanations varied. See JURY CONSULTANT SURVEY, supra note 6 
(Respondent #24, Question 3) ("Challenge for cause is appropriate since there is a reasonable doubt as 
to fairness."); (Respondent #3, Question 3) ("Absolutely. Most judges already do this routinely and 
would be very surprised to hear that some of their colleagues do not. Good questioning by the court can 
easily identify these 'experts' and dismiss them."); id. (Respondent #9, Question 4) ("Judges should be 
very lenient in excusing such jurors for cause."); id. (Respondent #25, Question 4) ("We can eliminate 
such jurors . . . with peremptories and for cause-we get rid of most"). 
204. Id. (Respondent #17, Question 3). Another said that "Everyone is entitled to use his or her 
own personal life experience in deliberations. I am not afraid of this phenomenon and no one should 
be." Id. (Respondent #13, Question 10); see also id. (Respondent #20, Question 3) ("I don't think 
expertise per se is reason enough to warrant a cause challenge except in extreme circumstances. Jurors 
come to court with a variety of experiences and knowledge and this is a strength of our system."); id. 
(Respondent #6, Question 4) ("[S]ometimes a case may benefit from a skillful juror who has some basic 
and maybe even advanced understanding of the issues."); id. (Respondent #14, Question 7) ("In any 
case, a knowledgeable juror is preferable to an ignorant, incurious one who will not [or] cannot 
assimilate evidentiary nuances."). 
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"a neutral person who understood the subject, but did not lean either way on 
the outcome, would be an asset to the jury and the 
It is possible that these dissenting views from consultants merely reflect the 
reality that, depending upon the case and the individual juror, consultants may 
wish to have discretion to place a favorable professional with relevant expertise 
on the Therefore, some jury consultants may not support a change in 
the law to allow professional jurors to be challenged for cause based simply on 
their expertise, because that would limit a consultant's flexibility in choosing 
jurors most helpful to his client's position. One consultant's comments support 
this theory directly: "[It] is not a black and white issue. [It dlepends entirely 
upon the case issues involved and the experience that the expert [has]."207 
Another noted candidly that "[hlow I would treat an 'expert' juror . . . depends 
on . . . whether or not my client would benefit from the expert juror's 
knowledge and viewpoints and . . . if the expert is unfavorable, whether or not 
this juror is 'worse' than the other jurors being considered for exclusion."208 
Hence, even among those who would not endorse challenges for cause, there is 
widespread recognition that the opinions of professional jurors can be central to 
the resolution of a case. 
B. Professionals Who Are Chosen for Jury Service Should Not Be Gagged 
Tightening the law on challenges for cause in the manner discussed above 
would go a long way toward screening professional jurors from cases in which 
they ought not serve. It would also be the most efficient way to regulate 
professional jurors. As one commentator has noted, "[blecause it imposes the 
205. Id. (Respondent #26, Question 3); see also id. (Respondent #14, Question 7) ("In any case, a 
knowledgeable juror is preferable to an ignorant, incurious one who will not [or] cannot assimilate 
evidentiary nuances."); id. (Respondent #lo,  Question 3) ("Expertise alone should not be the 
determining factor in the court deciding to remove a juror for cause."); id. (Respondent #17, Question 2) 
(same); id. (Respondent #20, Question 3) ("Jurors come to court with a variety of experiences and 
knowledge and this is a strength of our system."); id. (Respondent #23, Question 3) (''[]If the potential 
juror admits bias that cannot be set aside, the potential juror should be excluded for cause. The expertise 
alone is not sufticient grounds for a cause challenge. The potential juror must be irresolvably biased."); 
id. (Respondent #25, Question 3) (arguing that courts should only allow challenge for cause if there is 
bias that "we can articulate to support the cause; e.g., the prospective juror used to work for us or our 
opponent, [or] does business with one of the partners"). 
206. On this point, 28% of the respondents said that they wouldn't do anything if they thought their 
client might benefit. Approximately one-third said that how they would respond would depend very 
much on the situation. Survey-Final Results, supra note 165 (Question 2). 
207. Id. (Respondent #6, Question 2). 
208. Id. (Respondent # lo ,  Question 2); see also id. (Respondent #23, Question 10) ("I would be 
worried if the expert juror had unfavorable opinions. However, 1 would not be worried if I felt that the 
expert juror was favorable to my client."). This may also explain why, when respondents were asked 
whether or not they would feel comfortable having an expert juror rely on his or her expertise, the 
responses were ambiguous. Only 21% unequivocally said yes, they would feel comfortable. Survey- 
Final Results, supra note 165 (Question 6). In addition, when asked whether they would prefer having a 
highly educated person who may be better able to grasp the subject matter than a less educated juror, 
52% said yes, only 10% said no, and 31% said it would depend. Id. (Question 9). 
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least cost, one of the best places to begin regulating juror expertise is before the 
jury is empanelled."209 
However, regularizing challenges for cause would not be a panacea. No 
matter how diligently judges use the proposed powers to disqualify 
professionals, some professionals will wind up serving on cases within their 
areas of expertise. Attorneys in some cases will not wish to challenge 
professionals; in other cases, attorneys will simply fail to consider the dangers 
of having professionals on the jury. Some jurors will intentionally hide their 
expertise; others will fail to disclose an area of special knowledge because they 
do not realize that it will be central to a case.210 The importance of key issues 
will not always be clear during voir dire, either to attorneys or to potential 
jurors.211 In short, even under my proposed reform, unchallenged professionals 
would occasionally sit on juries dealing with issues within the zone of their 
specialized knowledge. 
The question that remains, then, is whether such jurors should be subject to 
a Maragh-type limiting instruction, mandating that a professional juror refrain 
from using his expertise during deliberations. My answer is no: once bound to 
serve on a jury, the professional juror should not be gagged. Enough is known 
about the negative effects of gagging professional jurors to recommend the 
practice be abandoned outright as a weii-intended but ineffective and intrusive 
attempt to control a jury's de~iberat ions.~~~ 
A major difficulty with the Maragh instruction is that jurors who are given 
such a directive likely will not obey it. One law professor recently remarked 
about instructions generally that "[a]lmost all researchers agree that juries do 
well at determining the facts, but very poorly at understanding the law as given 
to them in the judge's instr~ctions."~'~ This is not because professional jurors, 
as a class, are willfully disobedient, but rather because a gagging instruction is 
wildly at odds with the broader instructions all jurors receive, which make clear 
that their overriding responsibility is to deliberate.214 
Moreover, the Maragh instruction may be impossible to follow. One of the 
209. Kirgis, supra note 9, at 535. 
21 0. Gershman, supra note 10, at 334-36. 
2 1 1. See supra notes 165-169 and accompanying text. 
212. Nevertheless, further research into the effects of experts on jury deliberations is needed. As 
this Article demonstrates, not enough is known about the actual effect of professionals on jury 
deliberations. 
213. Ellsworth, supra note 190, at 1403 (collecting citations). For a general discussion of the social 
science data on the difficulty that jurors have in following instructions, see Joel D. Lieberman & Jamie 
Arndt, Understanding the Limits of Limiting Instructions: Social Psychological Explanations for the 
Failures of Instructions to Disregard Pretrial Publicity and Other Inadmissible Evidence, 6 PSYCHOL. 
PUB. POL'Y & L. 677 (2000). But see MARDER, supra note 1 I, at 124 ("Although there are many 
shortcomings with judicial instructions . . . they nevertheless have a constraining effect on jurors and are 
a way in which a judge exercises some control over the jury both during trial and deliberations."). 
214. ABA PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES AND JURY TRIALS princ. 15 (2005) (noting the importance of 
"effective and impartial deliberations"). 
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primary ways jurors deliberate is by comparing their personal experiences with 
the evidence they hear at If the evidence squares with their experience, 
they are more likely to credit it; if it does not, they are more likely to discredit 
If a juror is a professional, it stands to reason that the professional will 
draw on personal experiences she has had as a professional. As one 
professional recently noted concerning her own experiences as a juror: "in the 
end there can be no question that your expertise and training stays with you at 
every moment of the experience. It is in your blood, it is in your  bone^."^" 
Professor McCormick made the same point beautifully when he observed that 
"filurors do not think evidence; jurors think about the evidence and to think at 
all requires a person to draw on his or her experience."218 
It has been argued that even an impracticable instruction can be useful 
because it puts the juror on notice that they should be cautious about the 
potential problem their expertise might cause.219 But this reasoning overlooks 
two dangers. First, charging a jury to do something that a court knows it will 
not-indeed, cannot--do fosters cynicism and disrespect for the judiciary and 
the law. Second, post-verdict disclosures indicating that instructions were not 
followed can lead to wasteful litigation, as the losing party will naturally seek 
to undo the jury's verdict, and a delegitimization of the jury system more 
generally. These high costs cannot be justified by the principle of giving notice 
for notice's sake. 
Finally, consider what would happen if a professional juror did attempt to 
meticulously follow the Maragh instruction. When the professional juror uses 
her expertise to form her opinion about an issue in the case, the instruction 
simply cannot work, as the professional juror's silence will communicate to the 
jury the forbidden information as clearly as would an affirmative disclosure. In 
attempting to follow the gagging instruction, a professional will essentially be 
forced to refuse to deliberate: while they know why they reached a particular 
conclusion, they will be prevented from explaining their decision to the rest of 
the In complying with one instruction, they will be violating another. 
This is precisely what would have happened in the Maragh case had the 
215. See, e.g., SUNWOLF, PRACTICAL JURY DYNAMICS: FROM ONE JUROR'S TRIAL PERCEPTIONS 
TO THE GROW'S DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 269-95 (2004). 
2 16. Id. 
2 17. Karten, supra note 184. 
218. MCCORMICK, supra note 138,s  327. 
219. Kirgis, supra note 9, at 528. 
220. Steele v. State, 446 N.E.2d 353, 354 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) ("The oath given to a jury prior to 
the commencement of a trial is not a mere formality. It is intended to impress upon the jury its solemn 
duty to carefully deliberate on the matter at issue."); 47 AM. JUR. 2D Jury 5 192 (2006); see also Diane 
E. Courselle, Struggling with Deliberative Secrecy. Jury Independence, and Jury Reform, 57 S.C. L. 
REV. 203,226 n. 1 13 (2005) (quoting an ABA model jury charge as stating: "It is your duty, as jurors, to 
consult with one another and to deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement, if you can do so 
without violence to individual judgment."). 
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instruction been given and followed.221 Recall that in that case two nurses sat 
on the jury. They agreed, based on their experience as nurses, that a key expert 
witness for the defense was not credible.222 Had the Maragh charge been given, 
they would not have been allowed to share the basis for their views with the 
rest of the 
But their silence nevertheless would have communicated the information 
the Maragh court wished to suppress. Moreover, by denying fellow 
nonprofessional jurors the right to engage the nurses in a discussion of their 
views, it is possible that the Maragh instruction would have enhanced the 
"mystique" of the professional jurors' choices.224 Silence removes any 
opportunity for lay jurors to independently evaluate the thinking process of the 
professional juror in their midst which is the very reason why courts instruct 
jurors to deliberate with one another. And if two or more members of a relevant 
profession shared the same jury panel-as actually happened in Maragh-a 
gagging instruction removes the opportunity for them to air and resolve 
differences. 
An imagined transcript of such a deliberation in a Maragh-type case 
illustrates this point. Recall that one of the central issues in Maragh, a 
homicide case, was blood loss. Imagine the dialogue which might ensue in such 
a case should a nurse, sitting on the jury, think that the defendant's expert was 
not believable: 
Nurse Ju ror :  I vote to convict. I don't believe the defendant's expert. 
Lay J u r o r  #I: Really? I thought he was very sincere and very credible. He told us 
that given the amount of blood loss that the victim sustained this wasn't a murder, 
but a death by natural causes. I am inclined to believe him and vote to acquit. Tell 
me why you don't believe him. 
Nurse Ju ror :  I can't. 
Lay J u r o r :  Why not? 
Nurse J u r o r :  The judge said I can't tell you. 225 
Lay J u r o r  #2: You don't have to. I think I understand-you have worked with 
trauma patients, right? 
Nurse J u r o r  (after a considerable pause): Yes. 
Lay J u r o r  #3: So you have seen cases of people who were killed and had the same 
221. Of course the instruction was not given in Maragh, but that is the reason why the conviction 
was reversed. 
222. People v. Maragh, 729 N.E.2d 701,703 (N.Y. 2000). 
223. Id. The Maragh instruction does not assert mind control but, if complied with, it forces a 
professional to refrain from disclosing his or her opinion when it is based on professional information. A 
professional might take his expertise into his own considerations, but he cannot verbalize such thoughts 
to the rest of the jury. 
224. Nor is this solely a question of deference. Silence may heighten the importance of the assumed 
expertise orperceived sincerity of a professional juror, because fellow jurors will not be able to hear the 
professional juror's reasoning and will thus be left to draw their own conclusions. 
225. Here, the juror refers to the now-standard Maragh instruction. See Juror Expertise, supra note 
17 ("[Wlith respect to any material issue in this case, you must not use any special expertise you have to 
insert into the deliberations evidence that has not been presented in this courtroom during the trial."). 
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amount of blood loss as the victim here? 
. Nurse Juror: I can't answer that question. 
Lay Juror #2: Say no more. 
In a scenario like this, lay jurors could easily conclude from the nurse's 
silence-silence required if the nurse is to comply with the Maragh 
instruction-that the nurse disbelieves the expert because of her specialized 
medical knowledge, as surely as they would know had she actually said it. 
Moreover, the other jurors would have to accept or reject the nurse's 
professional opinion without any further discussion, and jurors who have 
questions about the expert witness doubtlessly would be inclined to accept it.226 
The instruction here will have done no good and might even do unnecessary 
harm. 
The jury selection process is the proper stage to take aggressive action to 
eliminate the danger to a fair trial. It is the critical time for weeding out 
professional jurors who may later overwhelm lay jurors' abilities to express 
their own independent thinking. But once that stage has passed, we enter the 
time when the jury is asked to engage in the "sometimes mysterious" process 
of determining the truth.227 This is the time when courts must proceed with a 
"light Any interference with the jury's deliberative process is fraught 
with danger and should not be undertaken unless there are compelling reasons 
for doing so. 
The problems with a Maragh-type instruction were also amply reflected in 
the sometimes blunt but well-reasoned comments from professional jury 
consultants. In the survey, jury consultants were asked whether or not they 
considered the Maragh instruction to be effective. An overwhelming majority 
said that it was not.229 They reasoned that even the most conscientious 
professional juror would not know how to follow the Maragh instruction. One 
consultant wrote: 
[Jlurors have difficulty determining what they have learned as an expert . . . [tlhat 
would fall outside the purview if the trial. How easily can they determine when the 
evidence touches upon some of their expertise and when it does not . . . ? We ut 
them in a very difficult position [when we ask them to make this determination]. $0 
Another commented bluntly: "Face the fact that, instructed or not the 
[professional] juror will share [and] rely on knowledge; it's human 
226. And here, of  course, "lay" jurors include professionals who have no expertise in the relevant 
area. Indeed, it would be interesting to study whether other professionals might actually defer more to a 
relevant professional than would jurors without professional degrees. After all, the very essence of  
professional training is deference to specialized knowledge. In short, this is by no means a question of  
intelligence-as Professor Amar would have it, see supra note 31-nor even of  relative educational 
attainment. Rather, it is a question of  the cache of specialized training. 
227. Kirgis, supra note 9, at 535. 
228. Id. 
229. Survey-Final Results, supra note 165 (Question 7). 
230. JURY CONSULTANT SURVEY, supra note 6 (Respondent #3, Question 7). 
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dynamics."231 A third consultant stated that, "As a psychologist, my opinion 
would be that jurors cannot realistically deny their own expertise or biases. It is 
a sham to think that they can, and asking them to do so perpetuates the 
sham."232 And a fourth consultant explained: "Everyone brings all of his or her 
life experience to the courtroom as a juror. To artificially restrict a juror from 
using any or all of his or her knowledge is ridiculous."233 
Intriguingly, several respondents suggested that, as in the imagined 
transcript of the deliberations in Margagh, even if it were followed, the 
instruction would prove ineffective. These respondents reasoned that if a 
professional juror conscientiously observed the Maragh instruction, he might 
simply remain silent at a critical point in the deliberations. Ironically, the 
professional juror's silence could actually serve to heighten his influence, 
because as far as other jurors are concerned he is relying on "secret 
evidence."234 In this scenario, the professional juror would hold a good deal of 
sway, but there would be no open discussion among jurors to allow fallacies in 
his thinking to come out, or, indeed, to allow him to express his own conflicts 
or doubts. As one respondent noted, "~]urors naturally look to experts for 
leadership, even if [the] expert didn't share [the] basis of [his] position."235 
Not every respondent, however, shared this critique of ~ a r a ~ h . ~ ~ ~  One 
respondent suggested that, "The more technicai the case, the more important [it 
is] that the juror rely solely on evidence presented during the trial . . . . [The 
Maragh instruction asks them to] pay attention to the facts as presented."237 
Another respondent called it "the least malignant choice we have."238 Writing 
in a similar vein, yet another respondent noted that the Maragh instruction "at 
231. Id. (Respondent #25, Question 5); see also id. (Respondent #14, Question 7) (arguing that the 
instruction will not work because one cannot control a jury after it is selected); id. (Respondent #25, 
Question 7) ("It is the very rare juror who would deliberate without using hisiher knowledge as the basis 
for their opinion."). 
232. Id. (Respondent #17, Question 5); see also id. (Respondent #1, Question 8) ("The instruction 
is just useless of course."). 
233. Id. (Respondent #13, Question 6); see also id. (Respondent #9, Question 7) ("certainly not 
always"); id. (Respondent #13, Question 7); id. (Respondent #15, Question 5) ("I would be skeptical 
that the juror would actually follow this instruction. . . ."); id. (Respondent #17, Question 7) ( "Jurors 
will still use their background to argue forcefully-and probably logically-for their conclusions. They 
will just hide or not cite themselves as a reference."); id. (Respondent #20, Question 7) ("[Als a rule, 
jury instructions are generally ineffective, particularly limiting instructions."); id. (Respondent #23, 
Question 10); id. (Respondent #29, Question 7) ("Don't know, but doubt it from what I've seen. Jurors 
regularly disregard instructions of all kinds."). 
234. Id. (Respondent #5, Question 7); see also id. (Respondent #16, Question 7) ("1 think it sets up 
dynamics that are negative and divisive. Jurors wonder why the juror doesn't share information like 
others do."). 
235. Id. (Respondent #7, Question 7). 
236. Thirty-four percent of the consultants said they would allow the expert to rely on expert 
knowledge and share it with their fellowjurors. Survey-Final Results, supra note 165 (Question 5). 
237. Id. (Respondent #17, Question 7); see also id. (Respondent #I ,  Question 7) ("1 totally agree 
with persons not sharing with other jurors . . . . [The juror should rely on] testimony and facts not hisher 
own experiences."). 
238. Id. (Respondent #12, Question 7). 
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least puts them [professional jurors] on notice" about what they cannot do even 
if they may not follow the instruction precisely.239 However, the supporters of 
gagging jurors were in a clear minority,240 and as argued above, I believe the 
majority view of the jury consultants is the correct one. 
Finally, it is worth noting that there is no inconsistency between the two 
proposals advanced here. The first proposal seeks to rid jury panels of 
professional jurors before the trial starts. The second proposal accepts the 
reality that the time for weeding out professional jurors is before trial: once that 
stage has passed, and once the jury is asked to deliberate, courts must proceed 
with a "light "Freedom of debate," Justice Cardozo warned, "might 
be stifled and independence of thought checked if jurors were made to feel that 
arguments and ballots were to be freely published to the AS I have 
demonstrated, because a gagging instruction is ineffective and unduly intrusive, 
there is no justification for invading the province of the jury by seeking to 
control the behavior of some of its members. 
Although the presence of professionals in the jury box is a healthy 
development, it is necessary to recognize that, in certain cases, that presence 
can threaten the deliberative process. The law in this area is currently 
inadequate. It does too little to restrict professionals from serving on panels on 
which their expertise could compromise deliberations, but too much to restrict 
professionals' ability to serve productively as jurors once they are empaneled. 
The proposals outlined here would represent a substantial step forward in 
our ability to manage the presence of professional jurors. If these suggestions 
were implemented, the vast majority of professionals would serve only in cases 
in which they posed little danger of interfering with deliberations--cases not 
239. Id. (Respondent #4, Question 8) ("1 think jurors try to do what judges tell them to do."); see 
also id. (Respondent #7, Question 8) ("[Tlhere is an intentional and conscientious effort to follow 
instructions."); id. (Respondent #13, Question 8) ("They do their best, just as  you would. Most try to 
follow instructions. Only rogue jurors deliberately try not to."); id. (Respondent #26, Question 8) ("It is 
human nature to take notice of something that someone instructs you NOT to notice. However, jurors 
will always try to follow a trial judge's instructions. Just because they take notice of something that they 
were instructed to ignore does not mean that they will be persuaded by it."). 
240. See Survey-Final Results, supra note 165 (Question 7). 
241. Kirgis, supra note 9, at 535. 
242. United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 619 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Clark v. United States, 
289 U.S. 1, 13 (1933) (Cardozo, J.)). Judge Cabranes, writing for the Second Circuit, elaborated on this 
point when he noted that 
[a]s a general rule, no one-including the judge presiding at the trial-has a "right to know" 
how a jury, or any individual juror, has deliberated or how a decision was reached by a jury 
or juror. The secrecy of deliberations is the cornerstone of the modem Anglo-American jury 
system . . . the disclosure of the substance of jury deliberations may undermine public 
confidence in the jury system and poses a threat to adjudicatory finality. 
Id. at 61 8 (citations omitted). 
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involving factual issues within the zone of their expertise. At the same time, in 
the event that professionals did serve in cases related to their expertise, courts 
would avoid the inappropriate regulation of the deliberative process. 
Moderation and humility should guide our work here, both in making 
changes to the law, and evaluating the role the law should play in governing 
jury deliberations. As with medicine, the first rule of legal reform ought to be: 
"first, do no harm." 
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The survey had 29 total respondents. Not all answers tally to loo%, as not 
all respondents answered every question. 
Ouestion 1: 
Have you ever been involved in a case or cases in which there was a 
technical issue that a potential member of the jury had some background in 
either professionally or through education? 
Yes: 22 (76%) 
No: 6 (21%) 
No response: 1 (3%) 
If you answered yes to question 1, in the space below briefly describe the 
case or cases. We are interested in such details as what was the technical issue, 
the juror's background knowledge, and how did you choose to deal with the 
juror? 
Ouestion 2: 
Whether or not you have had this issue, if you were confronted with a 
situation in which there is an "expert' on the jury venire, what would you 
advise your client to do? 
(a) Challenge for cause 
Yes: 18 (62%) 
No: 5 (17%) 
Depends: 6 (2 1 %) 
/b) Peremotow challenge 
Yes: 16 (55%) 
No: 2 (7%) 
Depends: 9 (3 1 %) 
No response: 2 (7%) 
(c) Not challenge the iuror because vou feel the ootential iuror mav actuallv benefit 
your client if allowed to rely on orofessional knowledge 
Yes: 8 (28%) 
No: 11 (38%) 
Depends: 6 (2 1%) 
No response: 4 (14%) 
id) Not challenge for another reason? 
Yes: 2 (7%) 
No: 13 (45%) 
Depends: 8 (28%) 
No response: 6 (2 1 %) 
Ouestion 3: 
If there was a challenge for cause, what do you feel would be the best response 
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on the part of the court? 
(a) Grant a challenge for cause 
Yes: 17 (59%) 
No: 7 (24%) 
Depends: 3 (1 0%) 
No response: 2 (7%) 
(b) Not mant a challenge for cause. and force the partv to use a vreemvtory 
challenge 
Yes: 1 1 (38%) 
No: 9 (3 1%) 
Depends: 4 (14%) 
No response: 5 (17%) 
Please explain your answer: 
Ouestion 4: 
Do you think it is possible, realistically, to exclude such "expert" potential 
jurors from being chosen? 
Yes: 16 (55%) 
No: 12 (41%) 
No response: 1 (3%) 
If so what is the possibility and how could it be realized? 
Ouestion 5: 
If, despite any challenges, an "expert" juror was on the panel, what do you 
think would be the best way for the court to deal with deliberations? 
(a) Allow the "expert" iuror to rely on expert knowledge, and share this knowledge 
with the rest of the iurv during deliberations 
Yes: 10 (34%) 
No: 18 (62%) 
No response: 1 (3%) 
(b) Instruct the "exvert" iuror not to relv on his exvert knowledge at all 
Yes: 7 (24%) 
No: 16 (55%) 
No response: 6 (2 1 %) 
(cl Allow the iuror to relv on expert knowledge, but instruct the iuror not to share 
the knowledge with the rest of the iun, during deliberations 
Yes: 9 (3 1 %) 
No: 15 (51%) 
No response: 5 (1 7%) 
Ouestion 6: 
If an expert juror were chosen, would you feel comfortable having the 
expert juror rely on his or her technical background? 
Yes: 6 (21%) 
No: 19 (65%) 
No response: 4 (13%) 
Would your answer depend on the kind of case? 
Yes: 12 (41%) 
No: 16 (55%) 
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Depends: 1 (3%) 
If you answered yes above, what kind of case or case do you have in mind? 
Ouestion 7: 
Do you feel that a jury instruction that provides that a juror with special 
expertise may rely upon specialized knowledge to form their own opinion but 
specifies that the juror cannot share that opinion with their fellow jurors is 
effective? 
Yes: 6 (2 1 %) 
No: 22 (76%) 
No response: 1 (3%) 
Please explain your answer above: 
Ouestion 8: 
In your experience do you feel jurors pay more attention to a matter that a 
judge instructs them to ignore? 
Yes: 15 (52%) 
No: 10 (34%) 
Depends: 1 (3%) 
No response: 3 ( 1  0%) 
Please explain your answer: 
Question 9: 
If you were asked to consult on a case that involved a technical issue, 
would you prefer a jury of highly educated individuals that may be better able 
to grasp the subject matter? 
Yes: 15 (52%) 
No: 3 (10%) 
Depends: 9 (3 1 %) 
No response: 3 (10%) 
Please explain your answer: 
Question 10: 
Would you be worried that during deliberations such a juror would usurp 
the role of an expert witness who testified at trial? 
Yes: 20 (69%) 
No: 6 (21%) 
Depends: 2 (7%) 
No response: 1 (3%) 
Explain your answer: 
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